Tahafut_al-Tahafut-transl-Engl-van-den-Bergh

the knowledge of the eternal, he begins to argue against him, showing the
distinction which the philosophers established on this point between these
two sciences, and indeed this consequence is incumbent on Avicenna.
And Ghazali says:
I say:
How will you refute those philosophers who say that this
knowledge does not add to God’s dignity, for only other
beings need knowledge. . . ?
The summary of this is that, if all these perceptions exist only because of
man’s imperfection, then God is too exalted for them; and therefore
Ghazali says to Avicenna: Just as you acknowledge with your fellowphilosophers
that God’s not perceiving individual things is not a
consequence of an imperfection in Him, for you have proved
that the perception of individuals rests on an imperfection in the perceiver,
in the same way the perception of other things than Himself need not
derive from an imperfection in Him, since the perception of these other
things depends on the imperfection of the perceiver. ‘
The answer to all this is that God’s knowledge cannot be divided into the
opposites of true and false in which human knowledge is divided; for
instance, it may be said of a man that either he knows or he does not
know other things, because these two propositions are contradictory, and
when the one is true the other is false; but in the case of God both
propositions, that He knows what He knows and that He does not know it,
are true, for He does not know it through a knowledge which determines
an imperfection, namely human knowledge, but knows it through a
knowledge which does not carry with it any imperfection, and this is a
knowledge the quality of which nobody but God Himself can understand.
And concerning both universals and individuals it is true of Him that He
knows them and does not know them. This is the conclusion to which the
principles of the ancient philosophers led; but those who make a
distinction, and say that God knows universals but does not know
particulars have not fully grasped their theory, and this is not a
consequence of their principles. For all human sciences are passivities
and impressions from the existents, and the existents operate on them.
352