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Tahafut_al-Tahafut-transl-Engl-van-den-Bergh

a book on philosophy

a book on philosophy

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I say:

will, because His will has the same relation to all bodies, and

why should this body be specially disposed so that God

should move it rather than another? One cannot suppose

this; for it is impossible, as has been shown in the question

about the temporal beginning of the world. When it is

therefore established that this body needs as a principle of

movement a special qualification, the first division, that of the

movement through constraint, is ruled out.

So there remains the possibility that this movement

occurs by nature. But this is not possible, for nature by itself

is not the cause of motion, because the meaning of ‘motion’

is the withdrawal from one place to another place; and a

body does not move from the place in which it is when that

place is its proper place. For this reason a bladder full of air

on the surface of the water does not move, but when it is

immersed it moves towards the surface of the water, and

then it has found its proper place and has come to rest and

its nature is stabilized; when, however, it is transferred to a

place which is not its proper one, it withdraws to its proper

place, just as it withdraws from mid-water to the border of

the air. Now it cannot be imagined that the circular

movement is natural, since it returns to every position and

place which it would be supposed to abandon, and it is not

by nature that a body seeks the place which it abandons,

and therefore the bladder of air does not seek the interior of

the water, nor the stone when it has come to rest on the

earth the air. Thus only the third division remains, that of

movement by will. ‘

What he lays down in this section, that every thing moved either is

moved by itself or through a body from outside and that it is this which is

called constraint, is self-evident. But that for every thing which is moved by

itself there is no mover but the movedz is not a self-evident proposition; it

is only a common notion, and the philosophers indeed try to prove that

every thing moved by itself has an interior mover different from it, through

the use of other premisses which are self-evident, and of premisses which

375

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