Tahafut_al-Tahafut-transl-Engl-van-den-Bergh

together, and the difference between the two forces is that the binding
force in the world is eternal, because the conjoining principle is eternal,
whereas the conjunction between the parts of the sublunary animal is
individually transitory-although, through the eternal conjunction, not
specifically transitory-since it cannot be individually imperishable like the
world . z And through this theory the Creator will be deprived of that very
kind of perfection which nothing else can equal, as Aristotle says in his
book De animalibus. And we see nowadays that many of Avicenna’s
followers because of this aporia ascribe this opinion to him, and they say
that he does not believe that there exists a separate existence, and they
assert that this can be seen from what he says about the necessary
existent in many passages, and that this is the view which he has laid
down in his Oriental Philosophy, and they say that he only called this book
Oriental Philosophy’ because it is the doctrine of the Orientals; for they
believed that according to the Orientals divinity is located in the heavenly
bodies, as Avicenna himself had come to believe. However,
notwithstanding this they accept Aristotle’s argument to prove the First
Principle through movement.
And as for ourselves, we have discussed this argument at other times
and have shown in what sense it can be regarded as evident, and we
have solved all the doubts concerning it; we have also discussed
Alexander’s argument on this question, namely the one he uses in his
book called On the printiples. s For Alexander imagined that he was
turning from Aristotle’s argument to another; his argument, however, is
taken from the principles which Aristotle proved, and both arguments are
sound, though the more usual is Aristotle’s.
And when the argument for a necessary existent is verified, it is true
according to me in the way I shall describe it, although it is used too
generally and its different senses must be distinguished. It must, namely,
be preceded by knowledge of the different kinds of possible existents in
substance and the different kinds of necessary existents in substance.
And then this argument takes this form: The possible existent in bodily
substance must be preceded by the necessary existent in bodily
substance, and the necessary existent in bodily substance must be
preceded by the absolute necessary existent which does not possess any
potency whatsoever, either in its substance or in any other of the different
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