Tahafut_al-Tahafut-transl-Engl-van-den-Bergh

I say:
The only logical consequence of what he says here in the name of the
philosophers is that knowledge does not inhere in the body in the way
colour and in general all accidents do; it does not, however, follow that it
does not inhere in body at all. For the impossibility that the place of
knowledge should receive the knowledge and want of knowledge of a
thing necessarily demonstrates its identity, since opposites cannot inhere
in one and the same place, and this kind of impossibility is common to all
attributes, whether perceptive or nonperceptive. But what is peculiar to the
receptivity of knowledge is that it can perceive opposites together; and this
can only happen through an indivisible apprehension in an indivisible
substratum, for he who judges is of necessity one, and therefore it is said
that knowledge of opposites is one and the same. ‘ And this kind of
receptivity is of necessity proper to the soul alone. What is indeed proved
by the philosophers is that this is the condition of the common sense when
it exercises its judgement over the five senses, and this common sense is
according to the philosophers something bodily. And therefore there is in
this argument no proof that the intellect does not inhere in a body, for we
have already said that there are two kinds of inherence, the inherence of
non-perceptive attributes and that of perceptive.
And the objection Ghazali makes here is true, namely that the appetitive
soul does not tend to opposites at the same time although it resides in the
body. I do not know of any philosopher who has used this argument’ to
establish the survival of the soul, unless he paid no attention to the
philosophical doctrine that it is the characteristic of every perceptive
faculty that in its perception two opposites cannot be joined, just as it is
the peculiarity of contraries outside the soul that they cannot be together
in one and the same substratum; and this is what the perceptive potencies
have in common with the non-perceptive. It is proper to the perceptive
faculties to judge coexisting contraries, one of them being known through
knowledge of the others and it is proper to non-psychical potencies to be
divided through the division of the body so that contraries can be in one
body at the same time, though not in the same part. And since the soul is
a substratum that cannot be divided in this way, contraries cannot be in it
together, i. e. in two parts of the substratum.
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