Tahafut_al-Tahafut-transl-Engl-van-den-Bergh

which the view in question leads, which is very much like babbling in
metaphysics, is stupid and senseless talk. The artificial product in the
empirical world is produced, indeed, by only one agent, even if it
possesses the ten categories. How untrue is this proposition that the one
can produce only one, if it is understood in the way Avicenna and Farabi
understand it, and Ghazali himself in his Niche for Lights, where he
accepts their theory of the First Principle.’
Ghazali says:
I say:
One might say: ‘Perhaps there are in the principle
different kinds of plurality which do not result from its being a
principle, only three or four are manifest to us, and the rest
we do not perceive, but our incapacity for observation does
not shake our belief that the principle of plurality is plurality
and that from the one no manifold can proceed.’
If the philosophers made such a statement, they would have to believe
that there is in the first effect an infinite plurality, and one would
necessarily have to ask them whence plurality comes in the first effect.
And since they say that from the one no manifold proceeds, they would
have to concede that the manifold cannot proceed from the One, but their
statement that from the one only one proceeds contradicts their statement
that what proceeds from the First Monad possesses plurality, for from the
One one must proceed. Of course they can say that each term in the
plurality of the first effect is a first term, but then there must be a plurality
of first terms. It is most astonishing how this could remain hidden from
Farabi and Avicenna, for they were the first who made these silly
statements, and many followed them and attributed these theories to the
philosophers. For when Farabi, Avicenna, and their school say that the
plurality in the second principle arises through its self-knowledge and its
knowing another, it follows for them that its essence has two natures or
two forms, and it would be interesting to know which form proceeds from
the First Principle and which does not. And there is a similar difficulty in
their statement that the second principle is possible by itself, but
necessary by another, for its possible nature must necessarily be different
from its necessary nature, which it acquires from the necessary being. But
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