Tahafut_al-Tahafut-transl-Engl-van-den-Bergh

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differentiated in such or such way. And if you answer: Onedoes not inquire after the motives of the Eternal, well, let theworld then be eternal, and let us not inquire after its Creatorand its cause, since one does not inquire after the motives ofthe Eternal! If it is regarded as possible that the Eternalshould differentiate one of the two possibles by chance, itwill be an extreme absurdity to say that the world isdifferentiated in differentiated forms which might just as wellbe otherwise, and one might then say that this hashappened by chance in the same way as you say that theDivine Will has differentiated one time rather than another orone form rather than another by chance. If you say that sucha question is irrelevant, because it refers to anything Godcan will or decide, we answer that this question is quiterelevant, for it concerns any time and is pertinent for ouropponents to any decision God takes.We answer: The world exists, in the way it exists, in itstime, with its qualities, and in its space, by the Divine Willand will is a quality which has the faculty of differentiatingone thing from another,’ and if it had not this faculty, powerin itself would suffice But, since power is equally related totwo contraries’ and a differentiating principle is needed todifferentiate one thing from a similar, it is said that theEternal possesses besides His power a quality which candifferentiate between two similars. And to ask why willdifferentiates one of two similars is like asking whyknowledge must comprehend the knowable, and the answeris that ‘knowledge’ is the term for a quality which has just thisnature. And in the same way, ‘will’ is the term for a qualitythe nature or rather the essence of which is to differentiateone thing from another.The philosophers may object: The assumption of aquality the nature of which is to differentiate one thing from asimilar one is something incomprehensible, nay evencontradictory, for ‘similar’ means not to be differentiated, and‘differentiated’ means not similar. And it must not be believed54
I say:that two blacks in two substrates are similar in every way,since the one is in one place and the other in another, andthis causes a distinction; nor are two blacks at two times inone substrate absolutely similar, since they are separated intime, and how could they therefore be similar in every way?When we say of two blacks that they are similar, we meanthat they are similar in blackness, in their special relation toit-not absolutely. Certainly, if the substrate and the time wereone without any distinction, one could not speak any more oftwo blacks or of any duality at all. This proves that the term‘Divine Will’ is derived from our will, and one does notimagine that through our will two similar things can bedifferentiated.’ On the contrary, if someone who is thirsty hasbefore him two cups of water, similar in everything in respectto his aim, it will not be possible for him to take either ofthem. No, he can only take the one he thinks more beautifulor lighter or nearer to his right hand, if he is right-handed, oract from some such reason, hidden or known. Without thisthe differentiation of the one from the other cannot beimagined.The summary of what Ghazali relates in this section of the proofs of thephilosophers for the impossibility of a temporal proceeding from an eternalagent is that in God there cannot be a will. The philosophers could onlyarrive at this argument after granting to their opponents that all oppositesoppositesin time,b like anterior and posterior, as well as those in quality,like white and black-are equivalent in relation to the eternal Will. And alsonon-existence and existence are, according to the theologians, equivalentin relation to the Divine Will. And having granted their opponents thispremiss, although they did not acknowledge its truth, they said to them: Itis of the nature of will that it cannot give preponderance to one thing ratherthan to a similar one, except through a differentiating principle and acause which only exist in one of these two similar things; if not, one of thetwo would happen by chance-and the philosophers argued for the sake ofdiscussion, as if they had conceded that, if the Eternal had a will, atemporal could proceed from an eternal. As the theologians were unable55
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TAHAFUT AL-TAHAFUT(The Incoherence
Page 3 and 4: THE FOURTEENTH DISCUSSION: To refut
Page 5 and 6: occupies the central place in the u
Page 7 and 8: commentator of Plato and Aristotle,
Page 9 and 10: and Physics, have left the religion
Page 11 and 12: gives the philosophical arguments a
Page 13 and 14: eternity of the world. Plato himsel
Page 15 and 16: it is God who is passive; the impel
Page 17 and 18: of events out of time is like the u
Page 19 and 20: God everything is possible, a theor
Page 21 and 22: by the philosophers, of the emanati
Page 23 and 24: God possesses self-consciousness).
Page 25 and 26: and is found in Thomas Aquinas and
Page 27 and 28: He himself does not affirm that the
Page 29 and 30: is immortal when he will see in him
Page 31 and 32: For the unphilosophical, however, t
Page 33 and 34: Concerning the Eternity of the Worl
Page 35 and 36: for both agents, i.e. so far as the
Page 37 and 38: an agent endowed with a power which
Page 39 and 40: I say:analogous to our decision, it
Page 41 and 42: I sayinadmissible and that to admit
Page 43 and 44: I say:sun performs in twenty-four h
Page 45 and 46: possible, not necessary, and he wou
Page 47 and 48: valid so far as it concerns externa
Page 49 and 50: do not know of any one who makes a
Page 51 and 52: sophistical arguments is dishonest,
Page 53: say that the age of the world is a
Page 57 and 58: I say:inside the world, neither con
Page 59 and 60: similar things, a will which distin
Page 61 and 62: whereas the globe of heaven is homo
Page 63 and 64: constitute the poles. But the diffe
Page 65 and 66: move itself in space, in a definite
Page 67 and 68: deeds?’ May God make us perspicac
Page 69 and 70: seeing are equivalent in the eye. T
Page 71 and 72: would be no possibility of their av
Page 73 and 74: through the medium of a being etern
Page 75 and 76: This argument is sophistical. The t
Page 77 and 78: and with Him there was the world an
Page 79 and 80: I say:If we should say, for instanc
Page 81 and 82: The primitive meaning of the two wo
Page 83 and 84: of the fact that motion inheres nec
Page 85 and 86: and then assumes a time which has n
Page 87 and 88: I say:and places of the world. The
Page 89 and 90: I say:eternal. So much as far as bo
Page 91 and 92: I say:which doubles the whole of th
Page 93 and 94: I say:world smaller than He has cre
Page 95 and 96: I say:possible that the world might
Page 97 and 98: I say:and possible at another?’ I
Page 99 and 100: pronounce for one of these opposite
Page 101 and 102: I say:existence whether earlier or
Page 103 and 104: I say:and needs something to which
Page 105 and 106:
I sayThe second proof is that the i
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I say:essence nor matter’ and the
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I sayalthough it is not impressed o
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Ghazali says:I say:As regards their
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I say:He wants to force those who a
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all his books this is most clearly
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extension is nothing but time, and
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concedes the existence of an entity
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I say:connected with another condit
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so only through the corruption and
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that it passes into a relative non-
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I say:the remainder; indeed He can
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This theory of the flux of all exis
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moments is constant, and how can wh
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I say:which has a reasonable sense,
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things are two: matter and form, an
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I say:an imposture where their prin
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I say:says that the lamp makes the
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anterior to it. If God therefore is
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it tends and has an inclination to
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and to exclude the metaphorical sen
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Ghazali says, answering in defence
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I say:connected with Him, since the
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from it, it exists, not when the th
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All this is true. The act of the ag
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of the water, for this happens afte
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existence of the celestial bodies o
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I say:We answer: The consequence of
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one occurred, they gave three answe
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is partly the cause of unity, partl
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I say:is therefore nineteen; and th
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each other is a theory not known am
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defined acts can only arise from be
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and earth that he should be of thos
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I say:another be identical?’ we a
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the universal, the other specific d
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similar follows concerning the nece
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I say:for this it really is. But th
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I say:from His way and deviate from
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We say:The philosophers tried to ac
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bodies prior to them. Thus they wer
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thinks only its own essence, and th
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suppose its agent to act like an ag
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draw this conclusion. For if the pr
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And that one and the same existent
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unique mover . And just as the remo
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a plurality of existents without a
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In this discussion of the intellect
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I say:The meaning of this statement
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I say:is the principle of these dif
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the possible nature cannot become n
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I say:a cause, what makes it imposs
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qualitative, or in whichsoever of t
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But if one should say to us: ‘Cer
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receive a stronger degree of assent
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as the differences depend on differ
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moment from its action, the world w
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And as to Ghazali's words:It is eas
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However, it is not possible that th
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without an initial term; and if you
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I say:The difference between these
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I say:cause, but not of the series
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I say:If it is objected that this m
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or non-eternity of the world, and w
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THE FIFTH DISCUSSIONTO SHOW THEIR I
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I say:colour because of a cause whi
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black must be a colour either by bl
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I say:The answer is that we concede
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I say:composed of genus and species
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necessary existent, and this is imp
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For man before his existence has a
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and it is thus their task to refer
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identical with the knower of the sh
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And when it is said that He is gene
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I say:separate from matter is possi
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exist both an essence and attribute
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by themselves, just as, if their ex
Page 259 and 260:
If it is answered that the absolute
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I say:need a subject, as is the cas
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I say:If it is said: In the same wa
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would have to exist by itself, and
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essence is not true, for every esse
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Composition is not like existence,
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All their proofs where this problem
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consciousness itself is denied. But
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things, and our intellect, therefor
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I say:both, for the plurality and t
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be a knowledge in act and that ther
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It may be said that if it is assert
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And as to the affirmation of the ph
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two existents which differ in an ex
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Ghazali says:It may be said, `This
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I say:beings should exist by themse
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because they found that the acciden
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And as to the term `substance’ wh
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I say:black and white, fourness and
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I say:constitution of the essence o
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principle which is the cause of tha
Page 301 and 302:
Gods would have to be separated by
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distinguished by the fact that one
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one of these natures is superior to
Page 307 and 308:
Ghazali opposes this statement with
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against them about colouredness and
Page 311 and 312:
I say:mediator, participates in thi
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application of the term ‘necessar
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meaning is to ask whether a thing p
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we have rent them . . . ‘and the
Page 319 and 320:
Having assumed that they deny the q
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I say:plurality and duality on the
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assume one thing eternal by itself
Page 325 and 326:
I say:But the body is not a means f
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views, or regarded this as permissi
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wisdom in the product itself, namel
Page 331 and 332:
his attacks on the philosophers in
Page 333 and 334:
I say:not possible, and your statem
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together, and the difference betwee
Page 337 and 338:
I say:universe is known to God, and
Page 339 and 340:
acknowledged in the case of this pr
Page 341 and 342:
all things is attachment to matter
Page 343 and 344:
simply the hot body that accepts co
Page 345 and 346:
this conjunction and disjunction mu
Page 347 and 348:
not imply (as he falsely affirms of
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I say:philosophers do, or abandon t
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consequences which follow from his
Page 353 and 354:
But the knowledge of the Creator op
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I say:‘Well, let the seeing then
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acts which proceed from the arts, a
Page 359 and 360:
the utmost excellence, which is kno
Page 361 and 362:
move in circles and that between th
Page 363 and 364:
This is what we wanted to do first,
Page 365 and 366:
the person who takes up different p
Page 367 and 368:
universals must, by admitting in Hi
Page 369 and 370:
and if you acknowledge an eternal w
Page 371 and 372:
I say:But one may say: Why is this
Page 373 and 374:
existents would be the cause of His
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I say:will, because His will has th
Page 377 and 378:
they exclude heaven from this kind
Page 379 and 380:
And as to his affirmation ‘that t
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also have to ask about these bodies
Page 383 and 384:
THE FIFTEENTH DISCUSSIONTO REFUTE T
Page 385 and 386:
Everything he says here about the p
Page 387 and 388:
himself through trying to be in an
Page 389 and 390:
For instance, when a man sees that
Page 391 and 392:
on sublunary existence, so that, if
Page 393 and 394:
I say:any case, has to be proved, s
Page 395 and 396:
causes. Sometimes we know part of t
Page 397 and 398:
particular perceptions; that is, th
Page 399 and 400:
shows it to him by way of revelatio
Page 401 and 402:
if, however, reason does riot perce
Page 403 and 404:
And if they reverse this against us
Page 405 and 406:
the irascible and the concupiscible
Page 407 and 408:
study a problem common to theoretic
Page 409 and 410:
terms of the conclusion are present
Page 411 and 412:
The ancient philosophers did not di
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fire; for we regard it as possible
Page 415 and 416:
To deny the existence of efficient
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is not necessary, the philosophers
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I say:notwithstanding the fact that
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fire-not, however, absolutely, but
Page 423 and 424:
When the theologians admit that the
Page 425 and 426:
the angels there should arise a qua
Page 427 and 428:
serpent, and the scorpion, for thei
Page 429 and 430:
identification of black and white i
Page 431 and 432:
objectionable, and contrary to comm
Page 433 and 434:
that the judgement of our intellect
Page 435 and 436:
from the wolf while it walks behind
Page 437 and 438:
I say:it receives from the angels k
Page 439 and 440:
about its premisses, for the major
Page 441 and 442:
I say:in the doctrine of the philos
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a faculty in a body; and it follows
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indivisible; if the relation, howev
Page 447 and 448:
fainting, drunkenness, and the illn
Page 449 and 450:
saying that knowing is the opposite
Page 451 and 452:
Such arguments are all arguments of
Page 453 and 454:
claimed to be its organ, so that it
Page 455 and 456:
I say:his head than to his heels, a
Page 457 and 458:
I say:others-yes, it may be that th
Page 459 and 460:
I say:anger and the observation of
Page 461 and 462:
that Plato was forced to introduce
Page 463 and 464:
I say:thing occurs, does not produc
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separate substance has no opposite.
Page 467 and 468:
The Fourth DiscussionHaving finishe
Page 469 and 470:
which are attributed to Solomon. An
Page 471 and 472:
And all this, as you see, is confus
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