61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

«J»-stamp in passports, where the Swiss ambassador in Berlin Hans Frölicher
had spoken out in favour of marking the passports of German «non-Aryans»
and the head of the EPD, Giuseppe Motta, swept aside Rothmund’s doubts on
the matter. In addition to this type of direct responsibility, the EPD was continuously
involved indirectly with questions of policy on refugees in that its representatives
in other countries sent back information to Switzerland concerning
the persecution of Jews, received visa applications from those being persecuted,
made efforts to help Swiss citizens under the shield of their diplomatic
protection, or represented the interests of citizens of other countries under the
many protecting power mandates that had been confided to Switzerland. In this
connection, individual diplomats on the spot had considerable room for
manoeuvre; it can generally be said that the guidelines defined by the EPD in
Bern were very restrained and many a diplomat who tried to help refugees
violated the regulations in effect at that time and was disciplined accordingly.
Finally, Switzerland’s humanitarian policy, which was guided mainly by foreign
interests focused principally on the position of Switzerland as a neutral country
within the international context, also fell within the EPD’s area of responsibility.
In January 1942, the Federal Council appointed career diplomat Edouard de
Haller as the «Federal Council delegate to international relief organisations».
De Haller was Director of Mandates at the League of Nations from 1938 to
1940, and in 1941 was member of the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC). Being appointed to a newly created position, his main task was
one of co-ordination, and he saw himself more as an advocate of reason of state
than of humanitarian principles. In September 1942, he informed Pilet-Golaz
that the American Red Cross wanted to send food to increase the daily ration
for children whom Switzerland had agreed to take in. This offer of aid did not
please de Haller. As it came shortly after the borders had been closed in August
1942, he suspected that the Americans «wanted to undermine the Federal
Council’s official justification, i.e., the problem of food supplies». 85 Again in
March 1943, he expressed his opposition, for reasons of foreign and economic
policy, to an offer of clothing from the USA. De Haller realised that he was in
a dilemma with regard to international offers of assistance. If Switzerland
declined them, the problem of supplies could no longer be used to justify a
restrictive policy. If, on the other hand, Switzerland accepted foreign aid, then
there was the danger that the Allies might subsequently insist that it adopt a
more generous policy on admitting refugees, and Switzerland’s humanitarian
policy would lose some of its prestige because it had not financed it on its own.
The fate of the refugees played a very minor role in this type of strategic consideration.
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