61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

«For political reasons and for reasons arising out of the benefit to us of
Switzerland’s neutral position and future potential usefulness in restructuring
the economy of Europe, it is inadvisable to place too great a pressure
upon the Swiss government at this time in order to attain purely economic
warfare objectives.» 32
The foreign ministries in Washington and London also repeatedly showed
leniency because of Switzerland’s significance as a communications centre, an
espionage centre, and as host to the International Committee of the Red Cross
which provided services for Allied prisoners of war in the Axis countries. Thus
Switzerland always had a certain amount of leeway in its position between the
warring parties.
Scope for action and political legitimacy
In these war and crisis conditions, foreign trade became essentially foreign trade
politics, and foreign politics became foreign trade policy. Paradoxically, this
crossover made it easier to separate business and politics in foreign relations.
Within changing interest constellations and power situations, the Swiss authorities
conducted negotiations during the war which were aimed primarily at
ensuring that the country was adequately supplied. It was precisely this
approach which also met German requirements and was able to take into
account the profit calculations of Swiss companies. Supply bottlenecks and lost
markets gave rise to a continuing process of negotiation on all sides, which
appeared to be the key to urgently needed economic resources. Negotiations
with the Axis powers, with the Allies, and also with the neutral countries, represented
a system of communicating channels where multiple repercussions and
interactions were discernible. Neutral Switzerland was positioned between the
fronts, and at the same time took advantage of the fact that modern industrialised
societies, such as underpinned the war on both sides, were in general
barely compatible with the rigid separation of economic areas and self-sufficiency.
In foreign trade policy negotiations, a contribution was also made by mental,
economic and political factors which were not addressed explicitly. Thus, for
example, the question arises as to why Switzerland did not strive harder to
achieve interdependency between gold purchases, Alpine transit and armament
supplies on its side, and raw material and food supplies on the German side; and
why, in turn, Germany did not make greater use of the interdependence of
economic and political processes to exercise extortion on its neutral neighbours.
This was dependent firstly on the fact that dividing the objects of the negotiations
made it easier to resolve the problems which arose. The systematic linking
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