61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

could be written off by the company. And so after the war, it was hoped in Vevey
that «neither Sarotti nor Nestlé in Vevey was mixed up in this business». An
internal note laid down the defensive strategy to be adopted in case Altmann
demanded compensation, assuming that Schenk had no written proof of what
had been agreed in 1938. It was stressed that Schenk had never behaved as a
representative of Nestlé but as the owner of Altmann & Kühne and had pursued
his own interests. For this reason, he should not be offered any assistance and no
correspondence should be entered into with him. The whole business had
nothing to do with Nestlé; attention should be focused on the German firm
Sarotti, which was an independent concern. And, although it was not exactly a
satisfactory solution, one could explain to the outside world that:
«When, after the «Anschluss», Jews were also persecuted in Austria and
their businesses liquidated, it was in Sarotti’s interests that the flourishing
firm of Altmann & Kühne not fall into the hands of some Nazi who would
no doubt have ruined it». 53
Both Bally and Nestlé made great efforts to acquire Jewish businesses or to
integrate them into the activities of their own companies. In Austria, they had
to face fierce competition as large foreign firms, and the authorities tended to
favour the local retail trade. There is no evidence, however, of a welldefined
policy against Swiss companies. Between 1938 and 1940, Wander
Wien GmbH, which belonged to the Bernese firm Dr. A. Wander AG, was
involved in three acquisitions in Austria. Wander had no problem taking over
two smaller Austrian firms; in the case of the Viennese pharmaceutical firm
Syngala GmbH, Wander was successful, as part of a Germano-Austrian foursided
consortium, in the face of competitors with good connections to the
National Socialist Party. As far as the authorities were concerned, the specific
knowledge of the branch and the commercial potential of Wander and its three
partners were decisive. 54
In view of the restrictions surrounding bank transfers and the difficulty of transferring
profits – for example in the form of dividends – to Switzerland, many
Swiss companies must have thought twice before investing in Germany by
taking over a Jewish business. At the same time, however, the existence of Swiss
assets in Germany that could not be transferred to Switzerland – or only with
considerable loss – and that risked losing in value was a good reason for
investing in tangibles. 55 This was the case of «Haus der Schweiz» in Berlin. 56 As
early as November 1932 Swiss Federal Railways (Schweizerische Bundesbahnen,
SBB), which rented premises on «Unter den Linden» in Berlin, was offered a
property nearby. The SBB subsequently contacted various Swiss banks and in
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