61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

liquidating them was out of the question. However, those banks which wanted
to reduce their exposure in Germany were not intent on a wholesale withdrawal;
rather, they sought to raise the quality of their investment by shifting their
lending business to more reliable German partners – because the latter (such as
IG Farben or the major German banks) were large corporations or enjoyed good
relations with the State and the Party. It was inevitable, in view of subsequent
developments, that several of these establishments should figure among the
most «problematic» of those profoundly implicated in the policies of Nazi
Germany.
When German imports switched from consumer goods to capital equipment,
particularly engineering products and machine tools, some Swiss companies
began to look around for new market niches whilst others, such as Sulzer AG in
Winterthur, withdrew. Although new direct investments in Germany had
practically ceased, Swiss investments grew steadily since enterprises had to
reinvest their profits as a result of exchange controls. Firms which had
committed themselves to activity in Germany felt that they had to conform to
the new political climate, to German business conditions and to the overall
environment. They disassociated themselves from Jewish shareholders and
dismissed or removed Jewish employees and managers in Germany and in some
cases in Switzerland too. They did not even change their behaviour when the
Swiss authorities pointed out to them that they were under no obligation to
answer questions about the «Aryan» or «non-Aryan» descent of their
employees, management board members or shareholders, and moreover should
not disclose any information of this nature. Finally, confronted with a fait
accompli, the authorities played along. The fate of those who lost their jobs in
this way varied: some were simply dismissed, whilst in other cases employers
saved their employees through transferring them to Switzerland, America or
even South Africa. Regardless of the consequences for those concerned, there
was no desire to endanger business activities in Germany.
The Swiss political authorities played a more important role in this strategic
adjustment than was in keeping with the tradition of a liberal market economy.
Partly this was related to the change in the international economic environment
in the 1930s. In view of the large financial investment in Germany, discussions
about clearing agreements were on the official agenda after 1934. In the course
of these discussions, public servants were routinely accompanied by representatives
of private interest groups such as Vorort (Swiss Federation of Commerce
and Industry, SHIV) and the Swiss Bankers Association (Schweizerische
Bankiervereinigung, SBVg). This link between state and business interests
reflected the trend towards the kind of organised corporatism characteristic of
the thirties. The state became totally enmeshed in a network of interest brokers.
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