61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

such as Rodolphe Stadler (Câbleries de Cossonay), Hans Sulzer (Sulzer AG,
Winterthur) and Carl Koechlin (Geigy) found themselves with central roles to
play.
More research needs to be carried out in this area. However, as things stand at
the present point in time, it may be stated that since the 1930s an informal
division of labour between the organised interests of private industry and the
Federal Council had developed within Switzerland’s political system. This is not
infrequently described as a «democracy of associations». The recent discussion
about the Articles dealing with the economy («Wirtschaftsartikel») in the Federal
Constitution focussed on the question of how the influence of associations could
be regulated through the Constitution. In 1947, the relevant Articles were
accepted in a plebiscite, together with the insurance covering old-age pensions
and payments to surviving dependants (Alters- und Hinterbliebenenversicherung,
AHV). In this corporatist system which became entrenched during the war
years under the regime of emergency plenary powers, the government assigned
important functions in the spheres of foreign trade, monetary policy, and social
policy to para-state organisations. After 1939, the Federal Council thus
operated asymmetrically: on the one hand, in the realm of refugee policy for
instance, it implemented far-reaching and tough measures, whilst on the other
it preferred to leave matters to organisations representing private interests.
After 1945, however, this structure gave rise to conflicts. When, as a result of
obligations it had entered into and ongoing external pressure, the Federal
Council took steps to restitute assets, as happened in 1946 and 1962, these
measures conflicted with the business interests represented by the associations
and organisations. Thanks to the delegation of implementation to the private
interest groups and businesses concerned – which was by now normal – there
was no actual resolution of the issues in question. In the 1990s, this led to the
realisation that the «solution» had itself become the problem.
Historical analysis of the Swiss government system shows that the «average»
profile of the members of the Federal Council represented the structural reality
– there was no place for charismatic leaders. Correspondingly, there was a dearth
of clear, courageous decisions conforming with the basic principles of national
policy. Given this background, the weak leadership in place in 1940 should be
understood not so much as a consequence of weak Federal Councillors but rather
as the reflection of the increased importance – generated by the events of the
day – of the business associations, of the organisations involved in the war
economy, of the negotiating delegations, and of corporate management. In these
circumstances the desire for strong, integrating national personalities was
distilled into the figures of General Henri Guisan and Friedrich Traugott
Wahlen (instigator of the «Wahlen Plan» which bore his name). These two
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