61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

appropriate to underestimate Switzerland’s contribution in quantitative terms.
Germany’s Clodius Memorandum in June 1943 stated that the deliveries of war
material from Switzerland represented only 0.5‰ of German production.
Statistics like this cannot explain how it is that German bodies time and again
expressed their gratitude for Switzerland’s economic support, even if one takes
into account the fact that such statements might conceal a high degree of
bureaucratic self-interest. Nevertheless, Federal Councillor Max Petitpierre
publicly admitted in 1947:
«These credits and the deliveries of war materials and other products […]
contributed to the war efforts of one of the belligerents. Not only had we
abandoned integral neutrality, but – even worse – in so doing, we were as
a rule deviating from the very notion of neutrality». 8
The focus of the question should therefore not be the possible prolongation of
the war. The crucial issue is whether the actors asked themselves any such
question, and to what extent behaviour at that time was disproportionate to the
latitude which neutrality bestowed.
Did Switzerland profit from the war?
Besides being accused of prolonging the war, Switzerland was also confronted
with the somewhat less openly expressed accusation of profiting from the war.
In 1945, it saw itself categorised along with disreputable stolen goods
racketeers, gold-hoarders and gunrunners. Its defensive rejection of such
criticism was supported by a variety of statistics which showed that
Switzerland’s gross domestic product grew less strongly during the war years
than that of the USA and Great Britain. 9 This argument falls short in the first
place because it says nothing about how the Swiss economy might have
developed without the influence of the war. The assertion that the gross
domestic product indicator showed neither a clear upward nor a clear downward
trend in the war years, but in fact stagnated, demonstrates at most that
Switzerland’s economy experienced neither a disastrous collapse nor a general
upturn. However, it gives no indication as to whether or not the war had an
overall positive or negative long-term effect on Switzerland in economic terms;
neither does it provide any information as to how profits and liabilities were
distributed amongst the various sectors of the population, areas of the country,
or branches of industry. Secondly, the comparison with the USA and Great
Britain is spurious: both these countries concentrated all their efforts on
increasing war production, thus causing distortions in production capability,
the inevitable correction of which after the war conjured up the widespread
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