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61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

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owners. In cases where the company’s owner was able to take legal action in<br />

Switzerland, the requests made by the provisional administrators were rejected<br />

by the judges and the blocked assets were deposited with the court. 38<br />

Assets of subsequent Nazi victims were also included in the flow of capital from<br />

France into Switzerland, in particular after the Popular Front’s election victory<br />

in 1936. The assets held by the main Swiss banks (excluding the private banks)<br />

on behalf of French customers thus rose from 241.6 million francs to<br />

520.4 million francs between 31 December 1935 and 31 December 1937.<br />

While assets were later transferred back to France or invested in the UK or the<br />

USA, many French customers deposited their assets in bank safes, invested them<br />

in Swiss property, or handed them over to be managed by lawyers and trustees.<br />

The flow of capital from Hungary into Switzerland also increased dramatically.<br />

The total capital held in Switzerland on behalf of Hungarian banks and<br />

individuals, also including subsequent victims of Nazi extermination policy,<br />

rose from 15.5 million francs in 1937 to 37.7 million francs in 1943, a year<br />

before Hungarian Jews started being deported to Auschwitz.<br />

Poland was another country from which large sums belonging to later Nazi<br />

victims were transferred to Switzerland. After overrunning Poland in<br />

September 1939, the new ruling power endeavoured to acquire Polish assets<br />

deposited in Switzerland. As early as 20 November 1939, the Polish bank Lodzer<br />

Industrieller GmbH asked Credit Suisse to transfer assets deposited with it to an<br />

account at the German Reichsbank in Berlin. The bank saw a fundamental<br />

problem in this procedure and asked its legal affairs department to examine the<br />

matter. The latter recommended not complying with the request since the<br />

customer’s signature had most likely been obtained under duress by the<br />

occupying authorities. A further reason for refusing the request was that it had<br />

come from Berlin and contained incorrect information about the amount<br />

deposited with Credit Suisse. The legal affairs department also pointed out that<br />

for Poland, German foreign exchange regulations represented a war measure<br />

taken by an occupying force and that Switzerland had not yet recognised the new<br />

political situation. Managing Director Peter Vieli subsequently discussed the<br />

issue with Rudolf Speich, his counterpart at the Swiss Bank Corporation. The<br />

latter contacted the Reichsbank, which agreed that in view of the unclear constitutional<br />

situation in Poland, Swiss banks were not obliged to comply with<br />

requests from German administrators (Reichskommissäre). Nevertheless, according<br />

to a file note «the directors of the Reichsbank and Dr. Speich were of the opinion<br />

that duly signed requests from customers for their assets held in Switzerland to<br />

be transferred to an account with the Reichsbank must be executed since<br />

absolutely no justification could be found for not doing so». 39 Although there<br />

were legal and moral objections to transferring the funds, the consideration that<br />

276

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