61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

– were able to withstand this «Germanisation» pressure to a substantial extent:
the major German shareholding group of Schweizer Rück remained intact,
except for Central Kranken, which had to be surrendered for party purposes in
1941 at the request of the Reich Supervisory Office; in spring 1942, the shareholding
issue had become «dormant» and Germany’s attitude towards
Switzerland had «become more conciliatory». The sell-off of Wiener Anker in
1943 took place for financial reasons and had been contemplated by Schweizer
Rück since the mid 1930s. This sale of a company which was traditionally well
established in the East European market proved very profitable at a time when
German insurers were keen to enter, via existing companies, what was perceived
to be a growth market.
Switzerland’s representative in the German-Swiss insurance negotiations, Hans
Koenig, never made any secret of his ideological aversion to National Socialism,
but continued to do business with Nazi Germany. In 1943, when the Allies
issued warnings against trade with Germany for the first time, he approached
the insurance companies and provided a vivid description of the trap which
awaited them in the event of Germany’s collapse: «If what we ultimately face is
ruin, it is better not to give in and face ruin than to give in [to Germany’s
demands] and face certain ruin». 7 Yet, he too was unable to resolve the dilemma
which he had outlined so clearly. In early 1945, when Germany’s defeat was
inevitable and the freezing of German assets in Switzerland became an increasingly
likely prospect, the Swiss insurance companies demanded payment of the
13 million francs which they had negotiated with Germany in an agreement
signed on 1 February. At this point, German exports had virtually collapsed,
and Koenig attempted, in intensive negotiations, to secure payment in the form
of Reichsbank gold – despite the fact that the freezing of German gold sales was
one of the Allies’ most unbending demands and the gold was known to have
been acquired through illegal expropriations. In mid February 1945, Koenig
stated: «Relations with Germany must not be broken off; our authorities also
share this view». 8 Indirectly, the Swiss insurance companies secured at least a
share of Germany’s final gold delivery on 13 April 1945. In its efforts to «grab
as much as possible» 9 of what could still be squeezed out of Germany, the
insurers did not balk even at looted gold.
How did the general developments in the pre-war and war years affect the future
of the Swiss insurance companies? The remarkable success of the Swiss insurers
is measured by comparison to the massive setbacks suffered by multinational
companies from virtually all the major insurance nations during these years, or
at least towards the end of the war; it does not reflect any additional war-related
profits but the ongoing stability and continued existence of largely intact
business structures and markets.
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