61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

Examining Switzerland’s role in these gold transactions raises two sets of
problems. The first – essentially political in nature – centres on the way in
which the SNB and the private banks appeared to regard these transactions as
«business as usual». Central banks adhering to the gold standard regularly
bought and sold gold from other central banks; this was the basis of the international
monetary system. However, the circumstances prevailing between
1939 and 1945 were exceptional. The gold transactions enabled Germany –
whose national currency was no longer accepted as a means of payment in the
international markets – to acquire foreign currency which could then be used
to obtain essential goods for its war economy. The German armaments industry
thus obtained strategically important raw materials and other key resources for
the war effort – especially tungsten, manganese, and other ores from Spain,
Portugal and South America, but also crude oil from Romania and bauxite from
Yugoslavia. This fact alone would not constitute grounds to describe the gold
trade as an illegal activity which violated Swiss or international law. But even
if this were all that could be said about the impact of these gold transactions,
political objections would – and do – still arise, since the trade served the
interests of Nazi Germany and undermined the objectives of the Allies’
economic war.
The SNB was well aware of the political dimension of this issue from the outset.
As early as October 1940, the SNB’s directors were aware of accusations in US
newspapers that Switzerland was assisting the Axis powers. The directors raised
this issue with the Swiss Government and approached the Federal Political
Department to discuss the Swiss response to possible Allied counter-measures.
At that time, the SNB argued that the US had not imposed a blockade on
German or Italian accounts, so America could hardly object to Swiss transactions
with the Reichsbank. At the same time, the transactions appeared to offer
some protection against German attack. In November 1940, a letter from Per
Jacobsson, chief economist of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), was
forwarded by the Chairman of the SNB’s Governing Board, Ernst Weber, to the
Federal Council. In this letter, Jacobsson refers to Reichsbank Vice-President
Emil Puhl’s view that the convertibility of the Swiss franc «constitutes a reason
for leaving Switzerland free». 12 In his accompanying letter to Federal
Councillors Wetter and Pilet-Golaz, however, Weber made no reference to this
dissuasive aspect; instead, he emphasised «Switzerland’s needs» and raised the
prospect of wide-ranging opportunities: «Nonetheless, there is practically no
doubt that the existence of a free currency, such as the Swiss franc whose status
is unique in Europe, can be of benefit to other countries on our continent as
well.» 13 It was only after the war – especially during preparations for the
Washington negotiations of spring 1946 – that the SNB directors claimed that
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