61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

Party member of the National Council since 1943, wrote in an article about
economic relations with Germany during the war: «‹Le malaise suisse› has
recently become a common expression, although probably more in public
debate and in press articles than in private conversation and discussions in the
pub down the street.» 6 This supports the finding that although in the years
around 1945 a debate was raging in the political arena about the charges made
by the Allies, this hardly had an effect on personal attitudes. Rather, the attitude
persisted as expressed – to quote just one example – in the foreword to the report
of the Federal Department of Economic Affairs (Eidgenössisches Volkswirtschaftsdepartement,
EVD) on the Swiss war economy from 1939 to 1948 published in
1950. The intention of that report was, in the authors’ words, «to remind the
Swiss people of a period in their economic history when much was achieved
through motivation and adaptability, community spirit, national solidarity and
fruitful cooperation between governmental control and private initiative which
enabled us to hold out in difficult times». 7 In keeping with the nation’s
collective memory, the «lessons of those years» were held up as a model for the
country’s future. This positive appraisal of national achievements was underpinned
by references to the country’s military preparedness and the army’s
resolve to fight.
Switzerland’s dual image
Already during the war there was a gulf between Switzerland’s self-image and
the way it was perceived by the Allies. A much-quoted statement by Winston
Churchill in autumn 1944 reads: «Of all Neutrals Switzerland has the greatest
right to distinction. She has been the sole international force linking the
hideously sundered nations and ourselves. What does it matter whether she has
been able to give us the commercial advantage we desire or has given too many
to the Germans, to keep herself alive? She has been a democratic state, standing
for freedom in self-defence among her mountains, and in thought, in spite of
race, largely on our side.» 8 must be seen primarily as a response to an indignant
criticism of Switzerland by Stalin. In general, opinions of Switzerland were not
positive. As early as the spring of 1941, a memorandum to the British Foreign
Office reported the opinion of a London Times journalist that the Third Reich
would not occupy Switzerland on the basis of rational considerations; this was
not only because Swiss industrial and banking concerns helped to equip the
Wehrmacht, but also because Switzerland was the place «where the bigshot Nazis
have parked their loot». 9 The American attitude can be summarised as critical.
Hence, among the staff of the Economic Warfare Division, which was established
at the US embassy in London in 1942, the opinion prevailed that
Switzerland was «an economic satellite of the Axis, and the source of part of Axis
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