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61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

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internal propaganda, exclusion of Jewish employees, appointing Party members<br />

to the board, etc.). In turn it was rewarded with advantageous production conditions<br />

– a head office in Berlin (1938) and a plant in Singen (1940) – and with<br />

being granted the title of «exemplary Nazi firm» which it shared with the<br />

likewise Swiss company Schiesser in 1940. It was the desire to survive rather<br />

than any ideological convictions which forced these subsidiaries into the arms<br />

of Nazism. As far as Maggi’s parent company in Kemptthal is concerned, it<br />

depended to too great an extent on the success of its German subsidiary not to<br />

support this policy, whether it wanted to or not.<br />

The means and the players<br />

The way in which these strategies were implemented depended on many factors.<br />

Among them, the legal structure of the companies, i.e., the degree of formal<br />

autonomy that the subsidiaries enjoyed, does not seem to have been a determining<br />

factor. Most of these subsidiaries were joint-stock or limited liability<br />

companies for which the parent company held all or the majority of the shares.<br />

Some of the subsidiaries, such as Brown Boveri in Mannheim, even had their<br />

own subsidiaries. In a few cases, the Swiss firm had several subsidiaries that were<br />

legally distinct entities. This was the case with Nestlé and DAN (milk products<br />

and later Nescafé as well) and Sarotti SA (chocolate and biscuits) taken over<br />

through share purchase in 1928/29, or AIAG, which held the share capital of<br />

several companies. In autumn 1939, these companies joined to form a sort of<br />

consortium called ALIG (Aluminium-Industrie Gemeinschaft) with its head office<br />

in Konstanz. It was managed by Hans-Constantin Paulssen, who was already a<br />

director of the main subsidiary, Aluminium-Werk Singen. This unique combination<br />

considerably restricted AIAG’s control of its German business affairs. To<br />

the Allies, AIAG appeared not to be responsible for its German business and<br />

could therefore hope to avoid having an administrator imposed and being put<br />

on the black lists. Furthermore, ALIG drew up a profit and loss account together<br />

with its affiliated companies, which made it easier to transfer what it owed to<br />

AIAG in foreign currency. Conversely, it was in Switzerland that three large<br />

chemical companies – Ciba, Sandoz and Geigy – had joined to form an alliance<br />

under the name of «Basler IG» (1918–1951), which operated like a cartel and<br />

enjoyed common leverage on the world market. At the other end of the range<br />

of formal structures, the factory that Geigy ran in Grenzach was not a subsidiary<br />

but depended directly on the Basel company. It was situated only a few hundred<br />

metres away, like an exclave in German territory. The frontier separated the two,<br />

however, and became an increasingly important barrier during the period we<br />

are dealing with. Production activities and the market for its products were<br />

subject to German legislation, and to the economic demands of the Nazi<br />

303

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