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61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

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eak off relations with Great Britain. Federal Councillor Minger for instance<br />

showed far-sightedness when he declared that the war could go on for a long<br />

time yet, and that Switzerland should not think of «begging Germany for<br />

mercy». 18 In the years that followed, both calculations proved right: it was<br />

possible to maintain, albeit minimal, trade with the Allied powers; at the same<br />

time, however, a strategy of understanding directed towards the Axis predominated.<br />

In the period after June 1940, various suggestions were also put<br />

forward to send a top-notch «reconnaissance mission» of business representatives<br />

to Berlin. These initiatives – originating both from the General and from<br />

circles friendly towards Germany – expressed a mood which also existed within<br />

the major exporting companies, that a concentration of Swiss efforts on the<br />

«large European economic area» under German rule was appropriate. In the<br />

summer of 1940, Germany sent out clear signals in this regard which were<br />

received positively by some Swiss business circles. The Interessengemeinschaft der<br />

Basler Chemischen Industrie (body representing the interests of the Basel<br />

chemical industry) declared at the end of August 1940 that it was imperative<br />

to act quickly and that<br />

«first and foremost we must commence trade policy activity in these continental<br />

areas where new economic structures, based on quite different<br />

principles are emerging as a consequence of the course of the war to date,<br />

and try to influence them in time to protect our position.» 19<br />

Bally and its relations with the Axis powers<br />

In some companies, the alignment with Nazi Germany involved a radical<br />

reorientation. The fact that this did not take place until summer 1940, and<br />

in response to pressure from the authorities, can be seen clearly from the<br />

example of the Bally Schuhfabriken AG in Schönenwerd. At the end of<br />

September 1939, its management discussed the risk arising from the «black<br />

lists published by Britain», and came to the conclusion that «all deliveries<br />

for Bally Wiener Schuh A.G. in Vienna must be suspended, as this company<br />

must be treated in the same way as a German company». 20 On 11 October<br />

1939 however, a management member noted that «Bern» would «disapprove<br />

[...], if we suspend our deliveries to Germany». It should «not be<br />

forgotten that we could be legally obliged to supply our German customers,<br />

and that we would not be acting neutrally if we supplied the entente states<br />

without restriction on the one side whilst holding back German consignments<br />

on the other». 21<br />

However, this «neutrality policy» argument (used, as it were, to justify the<br />

Swiss in supplying all the warring parties) was not enough to convince the<br />

187

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