61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

66 Schindler, Fragen, 2001 (Publications of the ICE), pp. 103f. See also section 4.2 included herein.
On the historical background, see Hug, Rüstungsindustrie, 2001 (Publications of the ICE),
section 5.4.
67 For other cases, see Schindler, Fragen, 2001 (Publications of the ICE), pp. 105f.
68 Between 1941 and 1945, more than 130,000 tons of goods were transported through Switzerland
in sealed or inadequately declared railway wagons. On this point, see the table in Forster, Transit,
2001 (Publications of the ICE), p. 85.
69 On this point, see Forster, Transit, 2001 (Publications of the ICE), pp. 80ff. and pp. 85f. See also
section 4.4 included herein.
70 Schindler, Fragen, 2001 (Publications of the ICE), pp. 111f. On the historical background, see Frech,
Clearing, 2001 (Publications of the ICE), pp. 119ff. and pp. 195ff.
71 Schindler, Fragen, 2001 (Publications of the ICE), pp. 85f.
72 Whether a complete stop to the gold trade with Nazi Germany would have been permissible is
questionable in terms of the non-partisan principle. See Grossen, Transactions, 2001 (Publications
of the ICE), pp. 152ff. and p. 201.
73 In particular, the expropriation of private gold in the occupied territories violated international law
(Article 46 of the Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1907).
On the other cases of expropriation which violated international law, see Grossen, Transactions, 2001
(Publications of the ICE), pp. 154ff. See also Mráz, Raubgold, 1998, pp. 212ff.
74 The value of the victim gold which can be proved to have been supplied by the Reichsbank to
Switzerland amounts to 7.2 million reichsmarks: UEK, Goldtransaktionen, 2002 (Publications of
the ICE), section 1.5.
75 Cf. Grossen, Transactions, 2001 (Publications of the ICE), pp. 180ff.
76 UEK, Goldtransaktionen, 2002 (Publications of the ICE), section 3.4. See also Grossen, Transactions,
2001 (Publications of the ICE), p. 183: «[...] si le directoire de la BNS n’a pas su c’est qu’il
préférait ne pas savoir et s’il a cru ce que lui disait le vice-président de la Reichsbank, c’est qu’il
voulait le croire.».
77 Grossen, Transactions, 2001 (Publications of the ICE), pp. 183ff., raises the issue of whether
Switzerland could make reference to the state of emergency in order to justify the SNB’s gold
purchases.
78 After the war, the German state was obliged, as part of its reparation payments, to make restitution
of or pay the victims compensation for the stolen gold. On this point, see Grossen, Transactions,
2001 (Publications of the ICE), pp. 183ff.
79 Grossen, Transactions, 2001 (Publications of the ICE), pp. 198ff. However, the Swiss Government
did not recognise the legal basis of the Washington Agreement. It regarded the payment of
250 million francs to its Treaty partners as the Swiss contribution to the reconstruction of Europe.
See Vischer, Aspekte, 1998, p. 54. On the issue of the binding character of the Washington
Agreement under international law, see section 6.2 included herein.
80 Today, rules of international law which are directly applicable due to their significance for the international
legal order (e.g. bases of international humanitarian law, prohibition of torture and
genocide, etc.) are deemed to be binding international law (ius cogens).
81 On this case law, see the following section 5.2.
82 On the impact of the Emergency Plenary Powers Decree on private law, cf. Giacometti, Vollmachtenregime,
1945, p. 70.
83 On the transfer of cultural assets in and via Switzerland, see Tisa Francini/Heuss/Kreis, Fluchtgut,
2001 (Publications of the ICE), especially chapters 4 and 5. See also section 4.11 included herein.
84 Cf. Siehr, Rechtsfragen, 2001 (Publications of the ICE), pp. 132ff. See also Tuor, Zivilgesetzbuch,
1940, pp. 496–497.
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