61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

esumption of debt service and were pursued with great determination on both
sides. Germany was able to put pressure on Switzerland and other creditors
using as leverage the debts owed to them. It was at this time that John Maynard
Keynes made his famous remark about the power of the debtor. According to
Keynes, a person owing the bank £ 100 has a problem. If, however, that same
person owes the bank £ 100,000, it is the bank which has a problem. Under the
circumstances prevailing at the time, Switzerland was a banker with an
enormous problem. The question arose as to the extent to which Switzerland
was willing or in a position to withstand pressure from Germany. Since there
was considerable interest on both sides in maintaining functional financial
relations, Germany indicated that it was ready to negotiate and was also
prepared to make concessions. The discussions on the resumption of debt service
led to the conclusion of a first «special agreement» between the two countries
in October 1933. This agreement was updated each year and guaranteed the
transfer of a large part of the outstanding interest due to the Swiss banks. This
solution satisfied the requirements of the banks, which were far more interested
in regular interest payments than the availability of capital stock. After
Germany extended the ban on transferring funds abroad on 14 June 1934, longterm
capital interest was included in the first Germano-Swiss Clearing
Agreement. An unequivocal consequence of German pressure and Swiss
diplomacy in 1933/34 was the fact that Germany was in a position to breach
the solid front of international creditor banks, a manoeuvre that suited the
wishes of the major Swiss banks too.
In the 1930s, negotiations on frozen capital demands remained a central issue
of financial diplomacy. Up until February 1938, total German debts abroad
were continually reduced through gradual repayments, redemption on
secondary markets (see below), and partly also as a result of the devaluation of
all creditors’ currencies (pound sterling in September 1931, the dollar in April
1933, and the franc in September 1936). Germany’s total debts to Switzerland
fell from 3.1 billion reichsmarks to 1.3 billion reichsmarks (a drop of 58%)
between July 1931 and February 1938, while debts to the USA decreased by an
even greater rate of 69% and those to Great Britain by 53% over the same
period. 15
Under the given conditions, the Swiss bankers achieved their aims in the
negotiations. But how did they perceive their negotiating partners, i.e., the
Nazi regime? The National Socialist movement had never made a secret of its
animosity towards international financial capital so that a stricter attitude on
the question of debt retirements was to be expected, and manifested itself in the
negotiations held in 1933 and 1934, as well as in the partial moratoria. On the
other hand, the government appeared to have become more stable and bankers
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