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61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

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much which would have failed to become known fairly swiftly to the attention<br />

of the decision-makers, whether in the public or private sector.<br />

Where the State was concerned, the ICE investigations reveal a distinct<br />

hierarchy in terms of the exercise of power. The absence of the Federal Council’s<br />

participation in certain decisive issues is particularly striking. This is a paradox.<br />

One might indeed have expected that the government would have regarded<br />

itself as especially responsible for performing important state duties in the<br />

difficult war years, both in order to ensure the safety of its own people and to<br />

demonstrate the credibility of the country to the outside world. Moreover, the<br />

Federal Council had emergency plenary powers which increased its responsibility<br />

and gave it all the authority it needed to decree far-reaching measures.<br />

The question as to why the government kept a low profile in central issues is of<br />

great importance from both a historical and a legal perspective.<br />

The absence of the exercise of political power is striking in two cases, above all.<br />

The first concerns the gold transactions with the Reichsbank. The Federal<br />

Council did nothing to obtain any information about this, and left the fundamental<br />

political decisions to the Swiss National Bank (SNB). Consequently, it<br />

scarcely became involved in matters which from 1940 right up to the end of the<br />

war proved themselves to be politically very problematical. It was the National<br />

Bank’s management which held the reins here, but not because it had received<br />

any great vote of confidence. Personal contact between the Federal Council and<br />

Finance Minister Ernst Wetter and the two members of the Governing Board<br />

of the National Bank, Paul Rossy and Alfred Hirs, was neither very frequent<br />

nor very friendly; the causes were therefore rooted, rather, in negligence or in<br />

an absence of understanding of the problem. The second case concerns railway<br />

transit through Switzerland. The Federal Council showed a lack of interest in<br />

this issue and left it to the management of the Swiss Federal Railways (<strong>Schweiz</strong>erische<br />

Bundesbahnen, SBB) to solve problems which were of a political order.<br />

There was virtually no response from the government to their urgent questions.<br />

Other files show that the Federal Council delegated responsibility to senior<br />

officials in the administration, especially where foreign trade policy was<br />

concerned. Jean Hotz, head of the Trade Division of the Federal Department of<br />

Economic Affairs (Handelsabteilung des Eidgenössischen Volkswirtschaftsdepartments,<br />

EVD) for instance, had more power than Federal Councillor Stampfli, his<br />

superior, from July 1940 onwards. Private industry was very influential, with<br />

associations playing a leading role as brokers, particularly the Vorort and the<br />

various industrial sector associations. These organised interests had a formative<br />

influence on the functioning of the war economy which had been built up since<br />

1937 as a shadow organisation and went into operation on 4 August 1939 –<br />

even before the military conflict had started. Representatives of Swiss business<br />

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