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61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

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down because their profitability was severely reduced due to restrictions<br />

imposed by the state, price controls, and tax levies. However, entrepreneurs<br />

were not free to cease manufacturing if the regime considered their products<br />

useful to the war effort. This was something that the manufacturer of optical<br />

instruments Wild in Heerbrugg (an offshoot of Zeiss in Jena) learned the hard<br />

way when, shortly after the «Anschluss» (annexation of Austria), it decided to<br />

close its plant in Lustenau, in Vorarlberg region. The Nazi authorities<br />

threatened the firm with drastic sanctions and formally forbade all cessation or<br />

reduction of activities. Some time later, Wild was able to sell its Lustenau plant.<br />

It therefore appears that not all businesses were in the same boat; all, however,<br />

including both German firms and subsidiaries of foreign companies, were forced<br />

to adhere to the strict terms of the demands of the regime and its vast bureaucracy.<br />

If they did not, they risked closure or confiscation. In practice, however,<br />

there was certain room for manoeuvring for those who were perceptive and<br />

clever enough to exploit it. In October 1936, the the Four-Year Plan office,<br />

under the authority of Hermann Goering (who was already Supreme<br />

Commander (Oberbefehlshaber) of the air force), was set up in addition to the<br />

regular ministries and government services. This organ, made up of Party<br />

bureaucrats and military and industrial figures, was in principle responsible for<br />

production and distribution of resources, for allocating labour, for managing<br />

foreign exchange, and for price controls. Although its powers were vast, internal<br />

rivalries and ill-defined procedural practices caused conflict with the already<br />

existing civilian and military administrative bureaucracies. It was a labyrinth<br />

in which it was possible, though not easy, to finagle one’s way and obtain advantages:<br />

procuring orders, obtaining certificates of public utility, recruiting<br />

resources and labour. The directors of some Swiss subsidiaries (in the chemical<br />

sector and Nestlé) managed to exploit this situation to the advantage of their<br />

companies without running too great a risk. Others, such as Maggi, were not<br />

so successful, despite the efforts they made and their open devotion to the<br />

authorities.<br />

Special manoeuvring leeway, narrow but profitable, was available to subsidiaries<br />

in the Baden area. Walter Köhler, the governor of this German State, was also<br />

in charge of economic and financial affairs. Although naturally a member of the<br />

Party, he was not a fanatical Nazi, unlike the regional Gauleiter Robert Wagner.<br />

An excellent manager, Köhler had been noticed by the ministries in Berlin; he<br />

was even considered as a successor to Hjalmar Schacht in 1937. In Karlsruhe,<br />

he followed a policy which was oriented less towards Goering’s objectives than<br />

to developing his relatively poor State, which suffered from being far from<br />

Berlin and close to France. Köhler made every effort to benefit the many Swiss<br />

companies that had set up subsidiaries in the region along the Rhine and the<br />

295

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