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61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

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defence sector. The consumer price index increased by almost 50% between the<br />

beginning of the war and 1942. Wage development lagged behind, causing real<br />

wages and purchasing power to drop by one-sixth on average. Social issues<br />

therefore moved increasingly to the foreground from 1942 onwards. The main<br />

single advances introduced in 1942/43 included the popular initiatives on<br />

family protection, pension insurance, the right to work, the prevention of speculation,<br />

and finally a general economic reform. 92 These reform proposals were<br />

determined by the post-war debate which began in 1942. A similar debate was<br />

held once in the summer of 1940 when the Swiss thought they would have to<br />

live under National Socialist hegemony for a long period. With the defeat of<br />

Germany at Stalingrad in the winter of 1942/43 and further allied victories, the<br />

focus shifted to a peace framework organised by the Allies which, however, had<br />

no clear timescale at this stage. In the autumn of 1942, a special section was<br />

established in the Federal Political Department (Eidgenössisches Politisches<br />

Departement, EPD) which was to deal with foreign post-war plans. 93 In the<br />

«election year» of 1943, the post-war framework was obviously an important<br />

subject.<br />

The military situation and the awareness of threat<br />

For a long time the illusion of the threat of war was shaped to a great extent by<br />

the recollections of the First World War. The view was that the mistakes «of the<br />

last time» should not be repeated, but hopes were also again focused on the<br />

success of neutrality and the military defence of the country. In 1939/40, the<br />

overriding desire must have been for the war to be over quickly. After the first<br />

successes of the Wehrmacht, this desire was probably superseded by the hope in<br />

the minds of most of the population that military preparations should continue<br />

and that the war should not end with the establishment of a «new order»<br />

dominated by the Third Reich. There was a widespread view that such an end<br />

to the war would put an end to Switzerland’s neutrality. According to contemporary<br />

reports of the mood at the time, the Swiss people had never really<br />

identified with any one of the warring parties; however, they were always pro-<br />

British due to a marked and profound aversion to both National Socialism and,<br />

to a great extent, to a powerful Germany, and also, surprisingly, increasingly<br />

pro-Russian as early as 1942.<br />

A description of the course of events must take into account the difference<br />

between the inevitably varied and subjective assessments of the situation and<br />

the operational, military course of the war. An acute fear of invasion need not<br />

mean that a direct, planned attack by the military forces of the enemy power is<br />

imminent. Conversely, it is also possible for a country to exist in relative security<br />

in times when there is a direct threat of attack. The question as to when<br />

81

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