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61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

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In view of the collaboration between the authorities and the relief organisations,<br />

can the latter be considered partly responsible for the restrictive policy on<br />

refugees? They certainly acted as a corrective element in the direction of a more<br />

open policy on refugees. It must be said that statements made by relief organisation<br />

circles can frequently be found which, from today’s standpoint, seem<br />

questionable in view of their closeness to the attitude of the authorities. In a<br />

historical interpretation, however, two aspects must definitely be taken into<br />

account. Firstly, there was little room for overtly dissident relief to refugees in<br />

the face of the socio-political rallying process taking place in the second half of<br />

the 1930s. Only the communists persisted in their opposition, in an undemocratic<br />

manner and increasingly taking their cue from Moscow. Their organisation<br />

Red Aid, banned in 1940 (together with the Party) refused to register illegal<br />

refugees with the authorities, which was one of the reasons why the Red Aid<br />

organisation was not included in the Swiss Central Office for Refugee Relief set<br />

up in 1936. Secondly, close collaboration often existed between the relief organisations<br />

and the political elite, who considered private charity activities to be<br />

part of their duties. This is true not only of the ICRC, in which the Federal<br />

Council personally had its representative, as described above, but also of the<br />

Swiss Refugee Relief and the relief organisations, which were funded mainly by<br />

contributions from bourgeois circles. A well-known example is the dual role<br />

played by Robert Briner, who was Chief of the Zurich Police Department and<br />

at the same time Director of the Swiss Central Office for Refugee Relief. At the<br />

Conference of the Cantonal Police Directors held on 17 August 1938, he asked:<br />

«Can’t we keep our borders more tightly shut? We’re having more of a job<br />

getting rid of the refugees than keeping them out.» 118 At the subsequent Police<br />

Conference of Cantonal Police Directors on 28 August 1942, he demanded that<br />

the borders be hermetically closed, declaring at the same time that his canton<br />

was prepared to set up and finance work camps for the refugees already here and<br />

to look for families willing to take in Jewish refugees. Federal Councillor von<br />

Steiger asked Briner to explain the outcome of the conference to the relief organisations.<br />

119 A month later Briner announced to the police directors that:<br />

«In order to solve the question of the refugees both sides must try to fully<br />

understand the other’s point of view, because these extremely difficult tasks<br />

can only be fulfilled through joint effort. In order to facilitate such collaboration,<br />

I have accepted to take over as director of the Central Office.» 120<br />

The relief organisations were thus also political partners of the authorities,<br />

useful in fulfilling many of the tasks arising from the policy on refugees and, as<br />

a rule, co-operative. On the one hand, this fusion made them a stronger body<br />

143

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