61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

of 250 million francs, half of which was contributed by the SNB, in exchange
for the surrender of all claims relating to its role in the incriminating gold transactions
during the war years – was based largely on Allied calculations which
centred on the amount of Belgian gold which had reached Switzerland. Indeed,
in May 1946, the fate of the gold from the Netherlands National Bank – some
of which had also been sold by Germany to Switzerland – and gold owned by
private individuals (such as the Melmer consignments to the Reichsbank) had
not yet been clearly established by the Allies. The Dutch Government only
became aware of this fact when it was already too late to amend the provisions
of the Washington Agreement and the amount to be paid by Switzerland. As a
result, the explosive issue of the gold from the Netherlands (which was
presumed to include a substantial amount taken from victims of Nazi
occupation) was never raised in Washington.
In a technical sense, i.e., in terms of its monetary policy, the SNB conducted
itself with greater autonomy and competence than during the First World War.
However, starting from 1942 in particular, it made a number of key decisions
relating to the German gold transactions which had little to do with the
technical aspects of currency management. Its analysis of the legal position after
1943 was fundamentally flawed. It was an affront to the Allies, who had
repeatedly warned Switzerland about the gold purchases, as well as to its own
advisors and the Swiss jurists whom it had consulted. It is hardly surprising that
the SNB’s decisions have – quite legitimately – been the subject of historical
and moral assessment on frequent occasions, and that its decisions are judged as
having been reprehensible.
1 Unless otherwise stated, this section is based on UEK, Goldtransaktionen, 2002 (Publications of the
ICE); Grossen, Transactions, 2001 (Publications of the ICE).
2 SNB Archives, minutes of the Bank Committee, 21 November 1940, p. 692 (original German).
3 Steinberg, Deutsche Bank, 1999, p. 56.
4 Interview with Philippe Marguerat, L’Hebdo, 23 May 1985, p. 90; Jean-Christian Lambelet: Wo
blieb der ökonomische Sachverstand der Bergier Kommission. Das Verhalten der Schweizerischen
Nationalbank war besser als ihr Ruf, in: Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 31 June 1998. For other publications
by Marguerat and Lambelet see ICE, Goldtransaktionen, 2002 (Publications of the ICE).
5 See Crettol/Halbeisen, Hintergründe, 1999.
6 See Rings, Raubgold, 1985; Smith, Hitler’s Gold, 1989; Jost, Bedrohung, 1983.
7 Nazi Gold: Information from the British Archives, History Notes No. 11, 1996. The mix-up was
also an issue in the press, see Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 19 September 1996, and the British Foreign
Ministry published a revised version of its report: Nazi Gold: Information from British Archives,
Revised January 1997.
8 Eizenstat, Efforts, 1997.
9 Downplaying this statement in an interview with the Cash magazine, No. 17, 27 April 2001.
10 Commission, Deutsche Bank, 1998; Bähr, Goldhandel, 1999.
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