61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

Division of the Department of Economic Affairs). The organisation of the
wartime economy was, however, structured in a highly asymmetrical way. On
the one hand, the Federal Administration would now intervene in important
issues regarding national supplies and conservation of resources. Wholesale and
retail prices, rent, mortgage rates, electricity and gas tariffs, etc., all became
subject to approval. The employment market and the food sector were particularly
heavily regulated. The compulsory labour service project and the system
of closed and graded rationing enabled important economic resources to be
managed in an ingenious way. At the other end of the scale was to be found the
currency issue, where the free convertibility of the franc was maintained and
where there was hardly any state intervention. Foreign trade, raw materials and
investments occupied a middle field dominated by wartime economy trade
unions, with whom the most significant economic entities regulated their
claims free of interference. Here too were situated the negotiating delegations
which accumulated considerable power and authority during the war years and
kept Switzerland running as a modern industrial country even under difficult
circumstances. Stipulations and quotas do not seem to have hampered the
modernisation of the Swiss economy in any way. On the contrary, a dynamic
innovative movement could be made out since the summer of 1940. This
movement was oriented towards a succession of post-war scenarios and, from
1942 on, towards preparing the industry of Switzerland for the future peacetime
economy.
The national military defence was closely linked to the economic defence. This
started as early as 1936 with the issuance of so-called «defence bonds»
(«Wehranleihe») in the amount of 235 million francs which had widespread
public support. This arms loan, also welcomed by the left wing as a job creation
loan, amounted to at least half of the ordinary Federal expenses for that year. 107
With that amount military protection could at least partly have been pushed
up to the required level. However, the national military defence situation was
precarious at the beginning of the war. There were no operational plans, and
insufficient heavy artillery. Mobility was based on antiquated conditions (too
many horses, too few motor vehicles), and there were practically no tanks or
military aircraft. In order to go some way towards compensating for these
weaknesses, the French and Swiss military forces had a secret understanding as
early as 1938/39 that they would work together in the event of a Wehrmacht
attack on Switzerland. The infantry was in a better condition and at that time
the soldiers were still prepared to wage a bitter struggle to defend Switzerland.
Here the initial natural spirit of self-defence can be seen. This was implemented
by the conscription mentioned above, the maintenance of an army, the arms
loans, the general mobilisation at the start of the war and the election of a
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