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61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

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acquired what it needed from abroad and from the Federal military workshops<br />

and their subcontractors. During the First World War, the latter exported<br />

components for weapons and ammunition on a large scale, but had no models<br />

of its own. 8 For reasons of arms policy as well as foreign policy, the Swiss<br />

government welcomed German arms manufacturers with export potential to set<br />

up location within its borders. The sharp decline in production at state<br />

armaments factories at the end of the First World War had caused social<br />

problems. The Eidgenössische Militärwerkstätten were able to increase their<br />

productivity by supplying parts to German arms exporters. At the same time,<br />

the new manufacturers would help to balance out fluctuations in orders from<br />

elsewhere. In its post-1918 foreign policy, the Swiss government expressed its<br />

disapproval of too firm a line with Germany, favouring instead a system that<br />

would ensure an equilibrium. It considered that once Germany had been<br />

completely disarmed, the Western powers too should reduce their level of<br />

armament. Germany should enjoy equal rights as a member of the League of<br />

Nations and should be adequately equipped to meet an internal as well as an<br />

external challenge from the Bolsheviks. This stand went so far as to elicit tacit<br />

acceptance and even sympathy at Swiss Army Headquarters, the Federal Prosecutor’s<br />

Office, and in diplomatic circles for the radical right-wing networks that<br />

were set up and became an international movement following the abortive Kapp<br />

putsch. It was in this milieu, to which the two organisers of the Kapp putsch<br />

Colonel Max Bauer and Major Waldemar Pabst belonged, that the personnel<br />

networks typical of the organisation of covert German rearmament were set up. 9<br />

Switzerland was not the most important location. Krupp preferred Sweden with<br />

its highly efficient heavy industry for perfecting its artillery weapons and<br />

expanding its tank production. At first Rheinmetall manufactured its<br />

automatic guns and light weaponry in the Netherlands whose seaports facilitated<br />

trade with traditional markets in South America and China. The aircraft<br />

manufacturer Fokker based in Schwerin took the bold step of sending 350<br />

railway wagons full of material to the Netherlands, while Siemens followed suit<br />

with its development of military communication technology.<br />

The most important transfers to Switzerland in the wake of the rearmament<br />

restrictions laid down by the Treaty of Versailles concerned the production of<br />

light automatic weapons, military communication technology, military optical<br />

lenses, and aircraft. The 20mm automatic cannon made by Becker Steelworks<br />

in Willich near Krefeld should be mentioned first. In 1921, Emil Becker transferred<br />

the patent for this weapon to Maschinenbau AG Seebach (Semag), a<br />

company he owned near Zurich-Oerlikon. The Chairman of the Board, engineer<br />

Fritz Hirt, presented this weapon to the leaders of the German army and Soviet<br />

parties interested in Munich and Berlin in 1923. The following year Hirt<br />

206

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