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61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

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«The nations which are today fighting to destroy each other will be little<br />

inclined after the war to show consideration for us, merely because we have<br />

been astonishingly successful in escaping the general fate. This moral<br />

viewpoint will one day be of vital importance, and we must take it into<br />

account right now. Our descendants too, will one day ask not whether we<br />

were cold and hungry during these years, but whether we had the strength,<br />

despite hunger and need, to preserve for the Swiss state the prestige which<br />

it deserves and needs.» 38<br />

The answer of the Federal Councillor responsible, the Minister of Economic<br />

Affairs Walther Stampfli, was short and to the point:<br />

«Prof. Muschg has suggested that our descendants will not be particularly<br />

interested in whether we did enough freezing and starving. I am not interested<br />

in what our descendants will say. I am much more interested in what<br />

the present generation would say if it had no coal and nothing to eat. [...]<br />

I have not yet, in the brief period that I have shared some responsibility for<br />

supplying our country, remarked any inclination on the part of our compatriots<br />

to forgo essentials in a sudden attack of idealised heroism.» 39<br />

The trade policy agreed between the administration and the economic associations<br />

towards the German dictators enjoyed wide political support and also the<br />

support of the media. It is true that there was criticism within the Vorort of the<br />

occasional high-handed approach of the association director Mr. Homberger,<br />

and the National Bank also recognised a monetary policy risk in the Federal<br />

Council’s loan campaign. But as the Federal Council and its negotiators were<br />

under pressure not only from the Germans but increasingly, from 1941<br />

onwards, from business owners seeking to export, there was in retrospect little<br />

alternative. As an additional argument, the state clearing loans were seen as<br />

evidence that Switzerland had succeeded in reducing its expenditure on defence<br />

policy through comprehensive contractual arrangements with Nazi Germany.<br />

The director of the Trade Division, Jean Hotz, looking back on the agreement<br />

of 18 July 1941, explained: «In the absence of an agreement, the result would<br />

have been additional expenditure on mobilisation amounting to around 1<br />

billion francs per year.» 40<br />

The pre-financing of Swiss exports to Germany allowed other Swiss interests to<br />

be served. What the Western powers called the compensation deal, which<br />

enabled Switzerland to send goods which were important to the war effort<br />

through German occupied territories to Great Britain and the USA, represented<br />

a significant German concession to Switzerland over the longer term. This «self-<br />

196

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