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61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

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leading figures in the Nazi regime rather than for being Party members. At<br />

Brown Boveri in Mannheim, for example, only three out of the nine members<br />

of the Board were Nazis. With the war and the considerable economic difficulties<br />

facing Germany, the explicit pro-Hitler line adopted by the companies<br />

became less marked, especially since it was understood that the Nazi leadership<br />

was keener on seeing performance than ideological alignment. This implies that<br />

their previous attitude had mainly been opportunist: they had to deal with<br />

competition from other companies and had to secure the authorities’ favour in<br />

order to win government contracts and obtain the resources necessary to fill the<br />

orders places. Two of the largest Swiss companies pursued this strategy to the<br />

extreme by appointing senior managers to their subsidiaries who, although they<br />

were admirably qualified for the job, were particularly well connected within<br />

the networks of the Nazi Party. In 1936 Lonza, appointed a new sales director<br />

in the person of the lawyer Alfred Müller «in order to have someone who will<br />

ensure good relations with the authorities in place since 1933». 5 A man with a<br />

similar character profile, Achim Tobler, was managing director of the Rheinfelden<br />

Aluminium Works (Aluminium Industrie AG, AIAG) from 1938 on.<br />

Maggi did not need to replace any senior managers at its factory in Singen: they<br />

all immediately became ardent supporters of the new regime and made a show<br />

of it. Other firms kept a certain distance, as can be seen in the attitude adopted<br />

by senior managers at Brown Boveri in Mannheim for instance. This was a large<br />

company which had several production sites, each with a number of subsidiaries<br />

of its own. The products it specialised in – electro-technical equipment, transformers,<br />

motors, and turbines – were particularly important for the war effort,<br />

especially for the German navy (submarines). Brown Boveri Mannheim had<br />

become virtually independent of all control by the parent company in Baden.<br />

The general director of Brown Boveri in Mannheim, an engineer called Karl<br />

Schnetzler, and his assistant, a lawyer by the name of Hans-Leonhard Hammerbacher<br />

who was head of finance and the company’s strong man, gave every<br />

expected outward sign of toeing the Party line; but they were not members and<br />

tried as hard as possible to shield their company from any political or ideological<br />

influence. Both men had married women of Jewish origin, which might well<br />

explain their reserve. On the other hand, they were fervent nationalists and<br />

shrewd businessmen. They had no scruples aligning the company, even against<br />

the wishes of the head office in Baden, with the war effort. It was only towards<br />

the end of the war, in the wake of the damage done to the manufacturing sites<br />

by the bombing raids, that a certain hesitation was first noticeable. Hammerbacher<br />

was even occasionally in contact with members of the German resistance,<br />

for example with Elisabeth von Thadden who was arrested and executed<br />

following the assassination attempt of 20 July 1944.<br />

298

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