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61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

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up in August 1941 in La Chaux-de-Fonds. This company filled one single minicontract<br />

for 100,000 S/30 fuses – also under technical difficulties – which it<br />

received directly from Germany.<br />

Vast entrepreneurial freedom – limited significance for national defence<br />

A comparison of the armaments companies mentioned here reveals that they<br />

enjoyed vast entrepreneurial freedom. Some firms concentrated their entire<br />

output on meeting German requirements while others supplied the British and<br />

American markets exclusively, and a third group sold – sometimes in various<br />

phases – to both sides. Almost any policy enjoyed the support of the authorities.<br />

For sales to Germany and Italy, the tax-payer financed Federal export payment<br />

guarantee in the form of a clearing credit for the export of arms, ammunition,<br />

and fuses was the decisive factor. Another important aspect was the supply of<br />

goods made in the Eidgenössische Militärwerkstätten. This violated the<br />

neutrality-linked ban on the export of such products from state-owned factories<br />

to belligerent countries, 35 as did the official control certificates and the use of<br />

Swiss military bases for presenting and testing arms, ammunition, and fuses<br />

destined for export. Oerlikon-Bührle, Tavaro, Dixi and others had a German<br />

purchasing officer stationed permanently on their premises. The German Industrial<br />

Commission (Deutsche Industriekommission, DIKO), hosted by the German<br />

diplomatic mission, made every effort to ensure that full Swiss production<br />

capacity was directed towards arming Germany. In the case of conflicting<br />

interests, exports took priority over the needs of the Swiss army. As the head of<br />

the War Technology Division emphasised after the war, it would have been a<br />

«mistake» to believe that<br />

«the Swiss armaments industry means only the small group of arms<br />

manufacturers which, as far as arms and ammunition are concerned, is<br />

made up principally of Bührle, Hispano-Suiza, Tavaro, Dixi, SIG and the<br />

Waffenfabrik Solothurn. Between 1 September 1939 and 20 May 1945,<br />

this group of companies received contracts [from the Swiss procurement<br />

agencies] worth a total of 144 million francs, which constitutes only<br />

around 5.3% of total expenditure on armaments. The other contracts were<br />

allotted partly to the Eidgenössische Militärwerkstätten (between 10 and<br />

15% approximately) and partly to private companies which, apart from a<br />

few minor exceptions, did not export any war material. [...] If one looks<br />

solely at the past, one can find only scanty support for the theory that the<br />

armaments industry is an extremely important factor in our military<br />

potential, and what one can find concerns only the particular sector of time<br />

fuses.» 36<br />

217

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