61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

in a far more clear-cut manner. It became apparent that the nationalist and
anticommunist propaganda of the frontists was not effective on a national
basis. 54
It was not until September 1936 that the franc, which belonged to the
shrinking gold bloc, was devalued by 30% as a reaction to the devaluation of
the French franc. It should be noted that the labour movement basically
supported this move for considerations relating to prices and foreign trade,
despite harshly criticising the wage reduction. The gold bloc was a thing of the
past. The devaluation came as a surprise to the Swiss public as the government
and the National Bank had made recent assurances that such a step was out of
the question. This calmed speculation on the Swiss currency, increased liquidity
on the capital market, supported the recovery of the economy in the light of
international rearmament and, last but not least, strengthened confidence in the
franc. 55 In conjunction with the improving economies abroad, devaluation
brought about the desired upturn in the economy that opened the way for
internal solidarity. The removal of the pressure of deflation was an important
prerequisite for the success of domestic integration within the «Geistige Landesverteidigung»
of the late 1930s described hereafter. A common denominator for
an economic and financial policy which had national support was found by
combining the strengthening of the army with job creation programmes.
Cultural consensus and converging positions in domestic policy
It may seem surprising that the policy of rapprochement which prevailed from
the mid-1930s onwards was implemented so readily in light of the often fiercely
conflicting views which were held at the time. However, during the two decades
after 1918 a broad moderate field had developed in the most important groups
across the Swiss political landscape – the Radical Party, the Catholic Conservative
Party, and the Social Democratic Party – which distanced itself increasingly
from the extreme positions of 1918 and 1933 and converged within the
«Geistige Landesverteidigung» from 1935 onwards. The more radical power
groups continued to exist, however, either as extreme wings within parties or
independent groups outside the party structures. 56
In the late autumn of 1936, a contemporary commentary accurately predicted
that the imminent economic change would also enable a political change to take
place: «the movement, which is gathering more and more ground, strives to
achieve a non-partisan union of all forces willing to develop and declare their
unconditional support for democracy», thereby «ending the sterile intransigence
of the parties». 57 The relative success of the «crisis initiative» did not
blind the labour movement to the fact that a «Front der Arbeit», i.e., an alliance
including important rural groups, would not be a realistic option. The so-called
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