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61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

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market became much more important as a consumer market for Swiss industrial<br />

products in the period from 1941 to 1943. The capacity and readiness of Swiss<br />

exporters to supply Germany did decline in 1943 and especially in 1944, but<br />

trade relations between Switzerland and Germany remained at a comparatively<br />

high level right up to the end of the war. 15<br />

In general, imports exceeded exports. Switzerland’s balance of trade with<br />

Germany tended to be negative (with the exception of 1943). Before 1942, and<br />

again in 1944, far more goods came into Switzerland than were exported.<br />

Economic relations with Germany went far beyond the relative levels of<br />

ordinary foreign trade structures and could no longer be described as courant<br />

normal. The above-mentioned clearing loans made it possible, despite the<br />

Reich’s chronic shortage of foreign currency, for all economic relations – as well<br />

as the trade in goods, there were also large volumes of «invisible exports»<br />

favouring Swiss creditors in the service and financial sectors – to continue more<br />

or less without difficulty until the end of April 1945.<br />

The economic exchanges also gave Switzerland the opportunity for an understanding<br />

with its powerful neighbour which minimised the risk of reactions<br />

from those parts of the Swiss population with an anti-German attitude. Thus<br />

Foreign Minister Marcel Pilet-Golaz explained at the end of July 1940 to Hans<br />

Frölicher, the politically flexible Swiss ambassador in Berlin:<br />

«We are pleased to hope that the conclusion of the trade negotiations<br />

currently in progress will give us an opportunity to indicate our<br />

willingness to adapt to the new situation on the continent, and to collaborate<br />

with Germany in the field of business. Should this create the<br />

impression of a détente – as we expect it will – it will be easier to find ways<br />

of gaining sympathy in other areas without exposing ourselves to accusations<br />

of servility which could come just as easily from Germany as from<br />

Switzerland [...]». 16<br />

The rapid defeat of the French army by the German Wehrmacht had caused<br />

shock amongst the population at this time. Switzerland was surrounded. As<br />

early as the day of the French capitulation, 21 June 1940, the authorities had<br />

«moved heaven and earth» to «bring about the promotion of exports to<br />

Germany down the line». 17 The Swiss President, Pilet-Golaz, promised in his<br />

radio address on 25 June that the priority now was to create jobs «at all costs»<br />

(«coûte que coûte»). The trade negotiators were working with notable determination<br />

to achieve an economic understanding with the Axis powers. Heinrich<br />

Homberger, a member of the negotiating team, wanted to avoid anything<br />

which might create tension with Germany. However, there was a desire not to<br />

186

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