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61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

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In summer 1940, the Swiss diplomacy and the military authorities made every<br />

effort to encourage the armaments industry to use its full production capacity<br />

to supply war material to Germany. Bührle, who maintained very good relations<br />

with Berlin, got most of the contracts. At the end of 1939, Bührle won his first<br />

contract for 8 million francs. At the beginning of August 1940, the German<br />

Army Supreme Command (Oberkommando des Heeres) and the navy ordered arms<br />

and ammunition for a further 195 million francs. By January 1943, Rudolf<br />

Ruscheweyh, a German arms dealer and armaments specialist who had received<br />

11 million francs in bribes from Bührle, had managed to acquire further<br />

contracts valued at 246 million francs from the army and navy. According to his<br />

internal accounts, Bührle supplied 20mm guns, ammunition and fuses worth<br />

around 400 million francs to Germany up until 1944. Oerlikon could not fulfil<br />

contracts worth a further 49 million francs. The authorities were aware of orders<br />

to the value of only 318.3 million francs (70%; see Table 2). Bührle relied on a<br />

large number of subcontractors: the cartridges were supplied by the Eidgenössische<br />

Munitionsfabrik in Altdorf and powder by the Eidgenössische Pulverfabrik<br />

in Wimmis, which constituted a violation of the neutrality-linked ban<br />

on state-owned companies exporting arms to belligerent powers. 27 SIG was also<br />

one of Bührle’s main suppliers. Owing to its lack of contacts at the German<br />

procurement agencies, SIG did not manage to export its own war material to<br />

Germany, as mentioned above. An important product it did supply to Germany,<br />

however, was SIG track-laying machinery, which was not considered as war<br />

material by the Swiss Federal Council.<br />

Between 1940 and 1943, the main customer of the Waffenfabrik Solothurn was<br />

Italy. In addition, thanks to the efforts of Rheinmetall Düsseldorf, it supplied<br />

Germany in April 1942 and in December 1943 with one tank gun and its newly<br />

developed universal automatic gun. Rheinmetall tested them at its own testing<br />

site in Unterlüss but did not manage to persuade the German procurement<br />

agencies to buy the 20mm guns from Solothurn. 28 This was even more<br />

surprising since Germany’s need for 20mm guns was greater than ever at that<br />

time. In summer 1943, Solothurn was left with 450 of its 20mm automatic<br />

guns and 150 boxes of 20mm ammunition imported from Germany, weighing<br />

a total of 120 tons, that had already been paid for by Italy but could not be<br />

delivered after Mussolini’s fall. After risky but unsuccessful efforts to sell them,<br />

the guns were destroyed in 1961. The Waffenfabrik Solothurn had more success<br />

with vehicles also manufactured for Italy which it was able to sell to the Swiss<br />

army in autumn 1943. Solothurn subsequently laid off the majority of its<br />

employees.<br />

Before the war the products manufactured by the Waffenfabrik Solothurn were<br />

sold by Solo GmbH in Berlin; from 1 July 1939 on, they were sold by Solita in<br />

214

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