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61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

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closer to the Swiss electricity generation plants than to the coal-fired power<br />

stations in the Ruhr. In the pre-war period, Swiss exports reached their highest<br />

level in 1936, covering 2.1% of German consumption. In absolute terms,<br />

supplies to France (until 1940) and Italy (until 1943) remained relatively stable<br />

(500 million kWh and 200 million kWh respectively). On the other hand,<br />

supplies to Germany increased substantially: from 300 million kWh in 1933<br />

and 500 million kWh in 1934, to 1.1 billion kWh in 1940. This increase was<br />

partly due to the coming on-stream of new hydroelectric power stations on the<br />

Rhine, but also to the electricity sector’s advantageous position in the clearing<br />

system.<br />

During the war – disregarding the fluctuations which were due more to the<br />

weather than to political or economic factors – deliveries to Germany remained<br />

more or less constant, with a slight downward trend. At the end of the war, they<br />

fell to around 100 million kWh. By contrast, supplies to France were resumed<br />

in autumn 1944 and reached their pre-war levels again over time. In statistical<br />

terms, the war therefore brought no major changes as regards the level of Swiss<br />

exports and Germany’s share of this market. In qualitative terms, however, a<br />

change occurred primarily for two reasons: firstly, the nature of electric<br />

consumption on the German side, which focussed on the requirements of the<br />

war economy, and secondly, electricity’s important role in Swiss economic<br />

policy.<br />

Thanks to their good connections with the authorities – to no small degree<br />

owing to the accumulation of official powers – the representatives of the<br />

electricity industry had little difficulty in securing the necessary export licences<br />

and, in particular, making generous use of the clearing system. This proved<br />

possible despite opposition from the central body representing the interests of<br />

trade and industry, the Swiss Federation of Commerce and Industry (Vorort),<br />

which was reluctant to grant such a powerful status to this sector. At the end of<br />

the war, the Vorort promptly used the opportunity arising from the decrease in<br />

coal deliveries to limit the supplies of electricity and thus the use of the clearing<br />

system. Vorort’s director, Heinrich Homberger, stated in December 1944: «If<br />

coal delivery now collapses so disastrously, our electricity exports will acquire<br />

the character of proffering aid. This we cannot justify. We must therefore readjust<br />

our electricity exports.» 4<br />

For obvious technical reasons, the transport of electricity was only of interest<br />

over shorter and medium distances. The electricity industry therefore primarily<br />

supplied customers in the immediate vicinity: Lombardy and Piedmont from<br />

Ticino or Poschiavo (Brusio-Werk); Alsace and Lorraine as well as Baden<br />

(Germany) primarily from the power stations on the Rhine. The supplies from<br />

Chancy-Pougny (Geneva) to the Schneider company in Le Creusot (Saône-et-<br />

222

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