61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

interests of Switzerland. However, a few years later, as a result of the tenacious
and skilful defence of German assets in Switzerland against claims made by the
Allies, the former German owner received the major part of his money back.
Camouflage was seen by the Germans as an expedient in a brief, non-global
conflict affording plenty of loopholes. Until the invasion of the Soviet Union
and the entry of the USA into the war, the trick worked, since it was possible,
despite British dominance of the Atlantic, to maintain access to the American
markets via the Soviet Union and Japan. IG Farben expressed its satisfaction in
this regard as late as March 1941. For one thing, the successful maintenance of
trading links was in this case based on camouflaged German branches in Latin
America which had been handed over to confidential local agents. Mail was sent
via another Zurich lawyer, Dr. Jakob Auer, who was one of the confidential
agents working for IG Chemie and the Sturzenegger Bank. The conflict with
France, which ended with its occupation in June 1940, also allowed some scope
for camouflage activities. Thus, a German branch posing as neutral managed to
escape detection until June 1940, when it dropped its mask. 20
On the other hand, in the face of a long drawn-out, worldwide conflict, camouflage
operations were just as inadequate as the potential of the German economy.
Growing isolation from world markets limited Germany’s prospects in both
respects. Countless camouflage companies found their way onto the Allies’
blacklists. German agencies which were still recommending camouflage in
1939/40 became increasingly sceptical in the second half of the war, and refused
such measures. In the last phase of the war, they totally forbade the granting of
any new approvals. Many camouflage operations ended up as meaningless
organisational shells; some continued to play a role in the trafficking and
relocation of looted goods, as in the case of Rodopia in Geneva for instance,
which began by secretly buying back German securities held abroad, but later
became an intermediary for the sale of stolen securities from the occupied
regions. 21 In the end, the German defeat put a temporary stop to all conceivable
options for preserving German interests abroad. In Germany, the Allies
captured an impressive amount of documents shedding light on the existence
of further camouflage operations which had until then remained undiscovered.
The total occupation of Germany created a very different situation from that
which had existed in 1918, and frustrated – as defeat became ever more
inevitable – the plans of all those business owners who had hoped to see the
circumstances of that first post-war period repeated. There is no documentary
evidence to prove that camouflage companies which remained undiscovered in
neutral states concealed extensive German resources from the Allies in the hope
of returning them into German hands at a later date.
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