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61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

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However, the Swiss government failed to inform either the banks or the parliamentary<br />

committees of the existence of this document. The banks likewise<br />

ignored the problem. The fact that banking secrecy was enshrined in the Law<br />

on Banks and Saving Institutions of 1934/35 reinforced the tradition of using<br />

private law to protect property in Switzerland. This combination of guaranteed<br />

ownership and legally backed discretion (breaches of banking secrecy were<br />

punishable under criminal law as an offence requiring public prosecution) was<br />

a major impetus for the expansion and the self-confidence of Switzerland as a<br />

centre for asset management. The banking system had committed itself – as<br />

shown in the chapter on gold transactions – to forming a quasi-autonomous<br />

organisation free from government intervention. In the years after 1945, it<br />

became apparent how successful the banks were in keeping the state out of<br />

regulating the unblocking of victims’ assets as time and again it succeeded in<br />

putting the government, which ought to have seized the initiative in this<br />

matter, in its place.<br />

In February 1947, the Legal Division of the Federal Political Department<br />

presented for the first time the draft of a Federal Council’s Decree providing for<br />

the registration of unclaimed assets in Switzerland. However, six months later,<br />

under pressure from the Swiss Bankers Association, the government abandoned<br />

the draft law. 63 In a counter-move, the Association conducted its own survey of<br />

its members to determine the total value of «unclaimed victims’ assets». The<br />

voluntary declaration and the assumption by the banks that by playing down<br />

the problem (quantitatively) they could prevent the planned Registration<br />

Decree in the long term, resulted in only the paltry sum of less than half a<br />

million Swiss francs in total coming to light. 64 This poor result can also be<br />

explained by the fact that in the early post-war years, the banks totally failed to<br />

declare many assets since – depending on the bank’s internal definition – an<br />

account was considered to be dormant only five, ten, or twenty years after the<br />

last contact with the customer. Basically, however, it was the aim of many banks<br />

to find as few unclaimed assets as possible. Some banks found it quite in order<br />

to give false information. The Union Bank of Switzerland (<strong>Schweiz</strong>erische Bankgesellschaft,<br />

SBG), for example, reported that it had found no assets at all<br />

belonging to victims of mass extermination. However, it can be proved even<br />

now that in the course of freezing and reporting German assets in Switzerland<br />

in 1945, it had come across customers whom it knew to have been deported by<br />

the Nazis and who would therefore also have fallen into the category of assets<br />

sought in 1947. 65 During these early post-war years, there was considerable<br />

reluctance on the part of the banks to admit that there was any problem. Adolf<br />

Jann, General Director of Union Bank of Switzerland and former Secretary of<br />

the Swiss Bankers Association, stated in 1950 that «the best solution» would<br />

445

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