61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

survival by building up material reserves and rallying positions. Accordingly,
suspicion as to the criminal origin of the funds concerned was particularly great.
There is a wealth of evidence to suggest that numerous initiatives of this kind
were in fact undertaken by German companies, even though the official policy
of the regime was to reject such defeatist plans out of hand. 26 There is evidence
of a great variety of methods for moving assets into Switzerland, one of the most
popular being invoicing too little or too much for traded goods, as this was
difficult to verify. The Swiss trade associations had to deal with the relocation
of licences; no consistent policy ever materialising people pursued a policy of
maximising the benefit to themselves. Nevertheless, the construction of
German production facilities in Switzerland and the camouflaging of German
products as Swiss were clearly viewed negatively. This was seen as a threat to
Switzerland’s own export opportunities, which were dependent primarily on the
goodwill of the victorious Allies.
Today, it is relatively easy to identify the motivation for these operations by
German companies along with the procedures and means used, even if the same
cannot be said for the actual figures involved. Furthermore, it is certainly true
that in the second half of the war, far more dubious and obscure transactions
came to pass. In these cases it was virtually impossible to identify the transferred
assets, their origin was often totally unclear or obviously illegal, and the same
applies to the routes by which they entered the country and the people responsible
for the movements. Large quantities also evaded the Swiss Clearing Office’s
investigations. Small goods which were easy to hide and smuggle across the
border predominated here. These were securities often stolen or diamonds
likewise often stolen or obtained by extortion, originating especially from
Belgium and the Netherlands, but mainly, and most importantly, banknotes,
which could be converted into hard currency in Switzerland. The extent of this
trade can be seen from the total collapse of the prices for various types of assets
as a result of over-supply. Diamond prices in Switzerland fell so sharply during
the course of 1944 that some planned transactions did not take place, the
German vendors taking their goods back despite considerable risk – or placing
them elsewhere in unidentified locations. The over-supply of banknotes, particularly
reichsmarks and French francs, caused these currencies to fall considerably
in value against the Swiss franc. Since the German occupation of France,
large quantities of banknotes held by the occupying forces had continually been
entering Switzerland. 27 According to a Swiss National Bank report in July
1943, the «members of the Wehrmacht in France» were «allegedly loaded with
French banknotes», some of which were brought to Switzerland and exchanged
there. 28 Since then, was frequently made reference to the questionable nature of
this trade. Even the Swiss National Bank spoke out in favour of banning it in
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