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61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

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on 7 March 1945: «after the ‹Russian bomb› of November 1944, the ‹American<br />

bomb› exploded on 4 January 1945. The American press has accused us of<br />

supporting their deadly enemy and acting as a fence by receiving looted goods<br />

from important Germans. Switzerland is being accused of being a country which<br />

is not only non-neutral, but pro-German.» This propaganda was said to have<br />

been «joyfully» accepted by the Russians, and the accusations also met with<br />

some response in South America, and the Middle and Far East. «A perhaps<br />

unprecedented isolation was threatening our country. It was clear that we had to<br />

take action in this situation.» 125 The so-called Currie Negotiations between an<br />

Allied and a Swiss delegation, which took place in Bern between 12 February<br />

and 8 March 1945, began with a hard confrontation of conflicting views. In his<br />

opening speech, Walter Stucki, the leader of the Swiss delegation, portrayed a<br />

Switzerland which had protected itself throughout the «terrible war» courageously<br />

as a democracy and irreproachably as a state under rule of law. 126 Laughlin<br />

Currie’s response, however, gave a completely different impression. He made the<br />

point that the Allies could not permit the financial operations of the Axis powers<br />

to thwart the objectives of a costly war and wreck the hopes for future peace and<br />

security. «Our enemies have chosen Switzerland as a country through which to<br />

conduct their financial operations not only because of its geographical position,<br />

but also because of certain Swiss banking laws and practices which are designed<br />

to permit persons wishing to do so to hide their identity and to operate in secrecy<br />

(…)» 127 Currie finally expressed the demand of the three Western Allied Powers<br />

that the fulfilment of the demands of Resolution VI of the Bretton Woods<br />

Conference of July 1944 should be «conditio sine qua non of the trade agreement<br />

under discussion». In view of the inflexible stance of the Currie delegation,<br />

Switzerland was left with no alternative but to give way. On 5 March, the<br />

American ambassador in Bern reported that the Swiss delegation had today<br />

«capitulated» after three weeks of dogged resistance. 128 The Federal Council then<br />

caused German assets to be frozen in Switzerland, the transit of goods and foreign<br />

trade with Germany to be significantly reduced, and gold purchases to be ceased.<br />

Walter Stucki described the objectives of these concessions as follows: «there is<br />

too great a danger of being too late. [...] We must be concerned with opening<br />

the door to the West today. [...] We must seek to join up with the Allied powers.<br />

This issue is the heart of the problem.» 129 However, from a Swiss point of view,<br />

the situation remained extremely tense. In a report by the Federal Political<br />

Department (FPD) of 23 March 1945 on the Currie Negotiations, the following<br />

statement was made about the programme of the Allies: «This programme<br />

pursues aims which are, without doubt, incompatible with our neutrality. This<br />

is actually a plan of economic warfare.» 130<br />

After the war ended the Swiss often advanced the argument that Switzerland<br />

95

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