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61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

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transportation of goods was not resumed until 1946, and then only to a<br />

limited extent. The Swiss Rhine fleet suffered considerable losses during the<br />

war years (out of 191 ships, 36 became temporarily unusable, and 21 were<br />

lost completely), but these losses were much smaller than those of the international<br />

Rhine fleet as a whole. As with the railway companies and the<br />

airline, an important strategic objective was to maintain or create good<br />

starting conditions for the period after the war.<br />

In contrast to the Rhine shipping, the small Swiss deep-sea fleet, whose<br />

establishment from 1938 onwards was seen as an exotic and fascinating<br />

phenomenon for this small land-locked country, has already been the subject<br />

of several studies. 4 An important link between overseas traffic and the rail<br />

supply route was provided by the shuttle service between the ports of Lisbon<br />

and Genoa.<br />

Weapons transport (north-south)<br />

Is it true, as a persistent rumour still maintains to this day, that weapons were<br />

secretly transported through Switzerland during the war, concealed underneath<br />

coal or in sealed wagons? No such deliveries have been tracked down and<br />

divulged. Deliveries of weapons, munitions, and of all kinds of war equipment<br />

to the warring parties, could take place by way of neutral territory only if they<br />

were conducted by private operators. The Hague Convention of 1907 left it to<br />

the neutral state to decide for itself whether or not it wanted to prevent what<br />

was seen in the first instance as purely commercial trade. Switzerland initially<br />

decided not to demand any prior authorisation from the Germans, even though<br />

a German Africa corps under Rommel’s command had been waging war in<br />

Libya with their Italian allies since February 1941, and transit heading south<br />

had therefore taken on a new significance. As late as 1942, an official from the<br />

Federal Political Department (Eidgenössisches Politisches Departement, EPD) was<br />

able to remark that consignments with military relevance «very rarely» passed<br />

through Switzerland, since the Germans preferred the Brenner route. 5 Nevertheless,<br />

the idea of introducing an authorization requirement was already being<br />

considered in the summer of 1941. This was introduced in October 1941, but<br />

the permits were easy to obtain. Even in summer 1942, Switzerland did not<br />

want to commit itself to a doctrine: «We have the honour of informing you that<br />

we prefer not to express an absolute theoretical view on the matter raised.» 6<br />

These were the words of Pierre Bonna, Head of the Division for Foreign Affairs<br />

(Abteilung für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten) and therefore the highest-ranking<br />

Swiss diplomat, when asked whether the transportation of catapults to assist<br />

take-offs on aircraft carriers should be approved.<br />

From summer 1942 on, however, officials began to be more careful, and permits<br />

229

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