61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

which, once peace returned, would be superfluous and therefore entail losses.
Furthermore, from 1942/43 on, a marked involvement in Germany was likely
to compromise a company’s chances of regaining its market share in the Allied
countries or those which were soon to be liberated (black lists). Only firms such
as Maggi or Schiesser (textiles), which outside Switzerland had concentrated
solely on the German market, were forced to cling to this line whatever
happened. In addition, there was the difficulty of transferring money owed to
the parent company in Switzerland, of paying out dividends to shareholders
(most of whom were Swiss), of licences, and of contributions towards corporate
administrative costs. The German fiscal authorities took a large cut: on average,
at least one-third. Still the situation varied considerably according to the legal
structure of the subsidiaries and their share capital which was often increased in
order to ensure a higher dividend. What was then left was subject to restrictions
on the transfer of foreign exchange and the workings of the clearing system. The
amounts that finally reached Switzerland were definitely not negligible, but
were still well below what would normally be obtained on a free capital market.
From a financial point of view, motivation among the Swiss companies to
expand their German subsidiaries was restricted, with the exception of those
such as Maggi which became totally dependent on the German market.
The second strategic concern of the companies was one of medium or long-term:
to maintain or acquire market share for the future. Until 1940, attempts to
achieve this aim consisted in the strategy of ensuring a presence, through
subsidiaries or holdings. This was often done by buying up local firms on the
largest possible number of markets in neighbouring countries (France,
Germany, and Italy) and, for those who were in a position to do so, in other parts
of the world. The latter included first and foremost the United States which,
during the inter-war years, became the world’s leading economy but was not yet
familiar to most Swiss companies. Nestlé and Hoffmann-La Roche established
a solid foothold in the American market. Nestlé transferred its central administration
across the Atlantic on the eve of the outbreak of the war (1939), and
in spring 1940 the general director of Hoffmann-La Roche, Emil Barrell (who
had already moved the head office from Basel to Lausanne) took up residency in
the United States. In this way he ensured the future of the company, although
there were also personal reasons for emigrating in that his wife was Jewish.
During the war, Nestlé generated over three-quarters of its turnover out of reach
of German influence under the name of Unilac. The firm’s European business
continued, managed from Vevey, but the two branches were legally separated.
This move had been prepared by Nestlé as early as 1936 by the creation of a
holding company. As mentioned above, Lonza and AIAG hesitated to invest, as
did Brown Boveri: its head office in Baden refused to approve what it judged to
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