61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

this kind would be abrogated after the war, and that the Swiss negotiators had
promised the Allied Laughlin Currie delegation at the beginning of March
1945 to forbid such transactions.
Other interests beside the settlement of old claims were involved. Most Swiss
businessmen were convinced that Germany’s economy would continue to
flourish after the war. For this reason having an early or ongoing presence on the
German market would bring major advantages. This explains a number of
personal and business decisions which in retrospect seem dubious. Leading
personalities in the Swiss business community on more than one occasion
defended their German wartime partners against the charge of having actively
supported the Nazi regime, that is to say issuing them so-called Persil-Scheine,
i.e whitewashing them. Documentary evidence exists of Swiss businessmen
camouflaging German assets. Some contractual agreements to this effect were
discovered after the war. In other instances, such as the famous case of IG Farben
and IG Chemie/Interhandel, there seem to have been no written agreements. In
the case of IG Farben, hopes were pinned on rescuing their interests in the USA
by entrusting them unconditionally friendly Swiss hands.
On the whole, in their assessment of likely developments in international
business after the war, companies generally reckoned with a strong demand for
advanced and innovative technology. Swiss engineering companies with a firm
footing in Germany, and a temporary monopoly owing to the absence of former
German competitors, would be able to profit from a development of this kind.
The Swiss authorities were sympathetic to this view held by the business world
and even shared it; to justify their policy they often invoked arguments about
the state of the labour market. The opinions shared by both these groups as
regards an increase in the importance of the German market explain to a large
extent the negative official attitude of Switzerland to the registration and liquidation
of German assets held in Switzerland, which had been agreed upon in
the Washington Agreement with the Allies in May 1946.
The overall attitude of the banks constitutes an integral part of this picture.
Their activities in relation to assets dating from the Holocaust era, which later
became a focus of restitution demands, took place largely on Swiss territory and
thus were not subject to any pressure to adapt to German law. Business interests
with the Axis powers, however, were deemed to be more important than the
interests of those customers who had handed over their assets for safekeeping in
Switzerland, or those of the original owners of «Aryanised» companies who
sought to protect claims they had against Swiss customers. In this connection,
it is significant that part of their balance sheet items was virtually held
«hostage» in Germany by virtue of the restrictions imposed through exchange
controls. On the basis of the available documentation, however, no generalisa-
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