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61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

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economic, social, cultural and spiritual national defence. If social disruptions<br />

similar to those during the previous war were to be avoided, such as the<br />

Landesstreik of 1918, there had to be a better social security system for soldiers,<br />

excessive price rises should be avoided, and the diminishing food supplies<br />

should be distributed more justly. Too, there was the question of whether<br />

Switzerland would be more successful this time in preserving its sovereignty in<br />

the area of foreign trade and in preventing any direct intervention from the<br />

warring powers into domestic matters.<br />

At the start of the war there was great uncertainty as to whether Switzerland<br />

would be able to meet its food requirements. Accordingly, the dominant<br />

motivation in the government administration offices and among the population<br />

was to prepare for the worst. 103 The Swiss were vulnerable inasmuch as they<br />

could only produce about half of their required calorie intake and had to import<br />

the other half. These imports diminished constantly throughout the war,<br />

however. In 1941/42, 50% of the amount of 1939 could still be imported<br />

whereas in 1944 the level was only 20%. If this calculation were to include only<br />

the overseas imports, the amount for 1943 would be significantly lower as the<br />

Allies had cut off the supply of food from the spring to the end of 1943. Supply<br />

(production) and demand (requirement) diverged to varying extents for<br />

different types of food. The aim of official agricultural policy was to reduce the<br />

overproduction of livestock and promote arable farming. Whilst the agricultural<br />

surplus could be exported to the neighbouring states, i.e., in actual fact<br />

only to the Axis powers, most of the food imports required had to come from<br />

the Allies’ sphere of influence.<br />

An agricultural programme launched in November 1940 («Plan Wahlen» – the<br />

«Wahlen Plan») does not appear to have been implemented to compensate for<br />

overdue supplies from the Western powers; instead, it seems to have been a<br />

defensive measure against the threat of being cut off by the Axis powers. This<br />

cultivation scheme, also called «Anbauschlacht» aimed virtually to triple the area<br />

of agriculturally cultivable land. By 1943, the area had doubled from 182,500<br />

hectares to 366,000 hectares. This increased the level of agricultural self-sufficiency<br />

from 52% at the start of the war to 59%. However, the reduction in<br />

average calorie consumption is not included in this calculation; if this reduction<br />

of the total calorie requirement is taken into account, the self-sufficiency quota<br />

rose to over 80%. The increased cultivation succeeded to a significant degree in<br />

compensating for the loss of overseas imports. 104 Whilst the Swiss viewed the<br />

«Anbauschlacht» as a strengthening of the spirit of resistance and survival, the<br />

Germans welcomed it as a contribution to the safeguarding of the European<br />

food supply.<br />

A differentiated rationing system ensured the supply of the most important,<br />

83

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