61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

machine tools and aluminium the contribution was around 3%. 27 On the other
hand, Swiss graphite electrodes, needed for the production of electrosteel, made
up 10% of total German production, and a figure of more than 10% can be
assumed for Swiss supplies of time-fuses and their components (for air defence
weapons).
These relatively small quantities are inconsistent with the great importance
stressed in numerous reports from the German ministries and Wehrmacht offices.
But these statements often contradicted themselves, sometimes illustrating the
rivalries between the authorities rather than the objective situation. The Nazi
offices had a tendency, in their internal battle for resources, to claim that
virtually every delivery was absolutely essential to the war effort and therefore
indispensable. The significance of the oft-quoted statements from representatives
of the authorities, which also appear in our studies, must therefore not be
overestimated. In fact however, special dependencies of the German economy
can also be identified: while it is true that most of the industrial sectors in
Germany and the continental area under its control were well enough developed
to get by without Swiss supplies, in the machinery sector and, above all, the
watch industry (which includes the production of detonators) we find a high
level of German dependency on the Swiss market. The German watch industry
was less specialised, and Swiss industry in general also proved itself through its
high quality products and its reliability – an advantage which the German
armaments offices emphasised on many occasions. Swiss machine tools in
particular were also characterised by this high quality: gear-wheel chamfering
machines, for example, were essential for the construction of aircraft and tank
engines in Germany. It can also be demonstrated that certain precision tools,
transformers, aluminium and ball-bearings were very important. It is not
possible today, however, to establish the extent to which German factories were
actually dependent on Swiss supplies, or whether they could have found replacements
elsewhere. Germany also obtained far greater quantities of more
important goods from occupied and partner countries.
Swiss supplies generally became more important as a result of the «total war»
declared by the Nazi regime at the beginning of 1943, in response to the defeats
on the Eastern Front and in North Africa. The sharp increase in armament
production in the next two years was accompanied by a rise in the need for deliveries
from abroad, including Switzerland. In the first half of 1943 in particular,
the German ministries and the Wehrmacht emphasised several times what they
saw as the great importance of Swiss armaments supplies. Whilst Armaments
Minister (Rüstungsminister) Albert Speer, and Wilhelm Keitel, Head of the
Wehrmacht Supreme Command (Chef des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht), wanted
to use economic pressure (blocking raw materials) to force Switzerland to supply
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