61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

operations. The financial means were provided by the Jewish side: in the first
case, by the liberated Hungarians themselves (around 7 million francs) and in
the second through a collection to which considerable sums were contributed
from the USA (5 million francs). Influential SS officers played an active role in
the negotiations. Finally, like many others, these deals did not involve the
national government. The latter accepted the rescue actions, having even agreed
in advance to the admission of 14,000 Hungarians; the February 1945 deal was
accepted as a fait accompli.
In summer 1944 Musy, who enjoyed good relations with supporters of the Nazi
regime, had been able to negotiate releases in two individual cases. In October
of the same year, he was asked by the Swiss «Association for Relief to Jewish
Refugees in Shanghai (later ‹Abroad›)» («Hilfsverein für jüdische Flüchtlinge in
Shanghai (später ‹im Ausland›)») to negotiate the release of a large number of
detainees. This relief association, which was supported principally by orthodox
organisations in the USA and Canada, made an uncompromising effort to rescue
Jews under threat, paying any price and rejecting any kind of political-strategy
consideration. In contrast, Saly Mayer, who represented the American Jewish
Joint Distribution Committee (JDC) in Europe, adopted a strategy of using
negotiations to delay deportation but handing over no funds to the other side
that could have prolonged their activities. In this respect he collaborated with
Ross McClelland, an American diplomat who represented the War Refugee
Board (WRB) in Switzerland and supervised the use of American Jewish relief
funds, since these private transfers were subject to American regulations on
wartime economy. Although the Allies were basically against paying ransoms,
the larger part of the 5 million francs from the JDC reached the Basel
headquarters of the Fides Trust Company because McClelland looked favourably
upon Mayer’s activities. The reason behind Musy’s negotiating role, however,
was probably a combination of three motives. Firstly, compromised by his
sympathies for the declining regime, he hoped to gain a better position in view
of the post-war period; secondly, he wanted to improve the Nazi regime’s initial
position for negotiating a cease-fire or a peace treaty with the Western powers
(or in any event, to the detriment of the old enemy to the east); thirdly, he no
doubt appreciated the income in return for his services.
German interests, particularly those of SS Reichsführer Heinrich Himmler, SS
Brigadeführer Walter Schellenberg, SS Obersturmbannführer Kurt Becher and
other members of the SS, were decisive in negotiations taking place at all. In
view of the imminent defeat of Germany, their intentions and illusionary expectations
seem to have been to facilitate establishing contact with the Western
Allies and possibly even reaching a separate peace agreement born of anti-
Bolshevik sentiment, or otherwise to improve their personal prospects for the
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