61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

of which can be followed through in the way in which the victims of persecution
were treated from the beginnings of the Nazi regime up to the post-war era. For
this reason, neither the threat of danger and the associated fears to which a small,
isolated country was subject, nor the question of what was known at what point
about the facts of the Holocaust, can assist much in explaining dubious patterns
of behaviour displayed towards the victims of the Nazi state.
To the majority of the population, the external threat, both in military terms
and also vis-à-vis potential restrictions in supplies of food and other vital items,
seemed just as real as the internal dangers (inflation and social conflict).
However, the most eminent economic or political decision-makers, who were
the ones responsible for this behaviour, were able to judge the situation far more
accurately. Even «Volkes Stimme» («People’s voice») sometimes set aside genuine
or supposed fears and self-interest. This is illustrated by the statement of an
«ordinary» woman quoted in April 1943 in the Berner Tagwacht:
«We think about flour far too much. We talk about flour far too much. We
exchange far too many flour, butter, meat and cheese coupons instead of
books and ideas. Flour is our greatest worry. For want of flour we can no
longer see that it is not just flour but completely different things such as
justice, dignity, and freedom of speech that are becoming more scarce, more
rationed. Let’s forget about flour every once in a while! At least about our
own flour, and think about those who have less, or haven’t any at all». 6
Similarly, the argument that it was impossible to know what was going on in
Germany until it was too late can be regarded as a pretext behind which
economic and political self-interest was concealed. As regards the effect which
the general perception of the threat of danger and the existing level of
knowledge had on political decisions, it should be remembered that the general
public had clear information only on refugee policy. The dealings with bank
accounts, investments in Germany, and «Aryanisation» were known only to
those involved in business and to the political authorities. And it can scarcely
be doubted that after 1933 the latter were aware of evolving Nazi policy and its
consequences. Prior to 1939, information was freely available and the general
public was well informed. But after the outbreak of war, the flow of information
was dependent on informal channels. And it was precisely the close links that
Swiss business and banking circles had established with Germany which
provided them with information which might possibly not even have been
readily available in Germany itself. Added to this was the fact that in
Switzerland incoming refugees brought with them information about the
human tragedy being played out across the border. There was therefore not
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