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61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

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German judicial bodies when the proceedings concerned the surrender of<br />

policies containing a clause offering the possibility of payment in Switzerland.<br />

No clear answer could be found to the question of what happened to policies<br />

which had been issued in Switzerland itself. In many instances of material<br />

damage, such as reimbursement for the damage caused during «Kristallnacht»<br />

on 9 November 1938, the post-war insurers offered very little co-operation in<br />

respect of the claims laid before them.<br />

Secondary financial significance, but great emotional value, was attached to the<br />

works of art, collections, cultural assets, and other movable valuables. They were<br />

included in the London Declaration of 5 January 1943 and the Agreement with<br />

the Currie Mission. Restitution was not easy, however: a large proportion of<br />

these objects had been passed from hand to hand – Switzerland often acting as<br />

a «hub» in this process. In many cases their provenance was no longer readily<br />

apparent. Although the dubiousness of the origin of many works of art should<br />

have been obvious, they were often acquired in more or less good faith by<br />

museums or art-lovers. As with the other categories of assets, in the case of<br />

works of art and cultural assets, information from abroad was awaited in order<br />

to identify possible looted assets. And so, on the basis of a list of objects<br />

compiled by the Allies, the Federal Council issued Decrees in December 1945<br />

and February 1946 allowing owners who had suffered losses to submit a petition<br />

to the Chamber of Looted Assets (Raubgutkammer) of the Federal Supreme Court.<br />

70 of the 77 objects on the Allies’ list were restituted, either through a court<br />

judgment or an out-of-court settlement. However, the Decrees issued by the<br />

Federal Government by no means solved the problem: they were confined to the<br />

war years and to the countries occupied by Germany after 1939, granted the<br />

owners a period of only two years to lodge their claim, and made no attempt to<br />

make these legal provisions known internationally, meaning that in the chaos<br />

of the post-war era many owners did not receive the information in time or were<br />

unable to find the requisite documents.<br />

The same governmental Decrees provided for the restitution of securities. But<br />

here too, the path to restitution was blocked by the banks with feigned legal<br />

obstacles despite the rather more flexible approach of the securities dealers.<br />

Moreover, the same short 2-year deadline made it almost impossible for private<br />

individuals to obtain satisfactory restitution.<br />

Hesitation on the Swiss side in accepting responsibility for the most recent,<br />

momentous past was not confined to material or financial restitution. It was also<br />

apparent in the fear in public and business circles of compromising important<br />

interests, meaning that obscure business dealings (Interhandel) or dubious activities<br />

on the part of a handful of middle-men, lawyers, fiduciaries, or business<br />

people were never explained.<br />

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