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61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

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other countries, before the war. But during the war, this advantage decreased on<br />

the German market more than elsewhere. In comparison with the efforts made,<br />

which were considerable, the immediate financial result was modest. On the<br />

other hand, it was possible to invest part of the capital accumulated and blocked<br />

in Germany in order to foster a policy of expansion, to meet demand, and to<br />

increase production in the medium term. The effects of this investment policy<br />

were seen only later and therefore represented only a minor contribution<br />

towards the war effort. They strengthened production potential for the period<br />

after the war, a period for which everyone was preparing. Not a single entrepreneur<br />

entertained doubts about the prospects he would enjoy once the war<br />

had come to an end.<br />

In effect from 1945/46 on, the same companies were able to continue or revive<br />

their activities without any major problems. They did, however, lose<br />

subsidiaries or factories which fell into the hands of the USSR or the puppet<br />

regimes they set up in Eastern Europe. Sarotti (Nestlé) was dissolved; PCI (Ciba)<br />

came under public control and was later nationalised; Nestlé Prague disappeared<br />

in 1948. In all other locations, Swiss ownership was respected. In the<br />

French occupied zone (Baden-Württemberg), there were threats of forced<br />

closure or seizure which, however, were not carried out. In general, the factories<br />

suffered very little from bombing raids (except in Mannheim) or fighting on the<br />

ground. Production equipment remained virtually intact – in a country which<br />

was devastated. Swiss senior managers were hardly alarmed. Several German<br />

directors who had severely compromised themselves and had been put through<br />

a «denazification» procedure, were dismissed. Only one of the larger Swiss<br />

companies paid the price of adopting the unfortunate strategy of depending too<br />

heavily on the Nazi market and complying with the Nazi regime’s wishes.<br />

Along with the Third Reich, Maggi too lost the war. It recovered only further<br />

to having accepted the merger proposed by Nestlé in 1947.<br />

1 Unless otherwise indicated, this section is based on the results of the following reports: Ruch/Rais-<br />

Liechti/Peter, Geschäfte, 2001; Straumann/Wildmann, Chemieunternehmen, 2001 (Publications of<br />

the ICE).<br />

2 Around 87% of the general expenses reimbursed by Swiss companies to their parent companies<br />

during the war came from Baden. FA, E 7160-11 1968/31, vol. 569, Licensing Office,<br />

«Regiespesen», 9 February 1949.<br />

3 For a more detailed description of the ambiguous character of Köhler see Bräunche, Nationalsozialist,<br />

1997.<br />

4 See also section 4.10, included herein.<br />

5 UBS Archives, SBV Fund, Lonza file, no. 6, letter from Schenker to Golay dated 8 September 1945<br />

(original German).<br />

309

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