61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

members of the management. In any case, on 4 May 1940 the committee
came to the conclusion «that deliveries to Germany are out of the question
for us at the present time». 22 By 4 July 1940, things had changed. Iwan Bally
now referred «in general to the urgent need to create jobs, and in particular
the need to revive exports, paying special attention to the clearing surplus
which currently exists in favour of Germany». This clearing surplus needed
«to be paid off as quickly as possible through the supply of goods». In order
to avoid breaching the blockade treaty with Britain, Bally continued, it was
necessary to ensure «that our company operates within the bounds of the
‹courant normal›»; any larger quantities would require the involvement of the
shoe industry as a whole, in order to put pressure on the Swiss-Allied
Commission mixte. 23
The clearing loans created the requirement for an export policy developed by
sharp-minded negotiators, and one which most businesses went along with once
Switzerland was encircled by the Axis powers. Within the Swiss negotiating
delegation, the dominant impression was that Germany «[is] currently very
close to us, and Britain [...] very far away». 24 In this phase, with Germany at the
peak of its military power, it seemed possible to achieve an optimum reconciliation
of corporate strategy, national interests, and policy towards Germany.
Thus Homberger explained at a meeting of the Swiss Chamber of Commerce
(Schweizerische Handelskammer) in May 1941 that one had to keep in mind the
«future structure of Europe» and focus on «constructive co-operation».
Switzerland’s own «sacrifices» should «help to maintain the independence of
our country». 25 Here we can see that foreign trade policy was identical with
foreign policy and/or defence policy.
Germany’s plans for using Switzerland as an extended «workbench», and
integrating Switzerland’s economic potential into Germany’s own efforts to arm
itself, did not, however, always work out. 26 Attempts by German ministerial
bureaucracies, the Wehrmacht, and the newly created departments within the
Nazi regime, to impose a buyer’s market in Switzerland, achieved only initial
success. Complaints from the German industrial commission (Deutsche Industriekommission),
which had been based in Bern since spring 1941, from where it
attempted to co-ordinate and strengthen the incoherent German ordering,
purchasing and procurement process, continued unabated. However, the
German decision-makers hoped that the economic incorporation of Switzerland
into the «New Europe» would also produce an effect in terms of political ideals:
together with the Scandinavian and south-eastern European nations,
Switzerland was to be encouraged to play an active role in a wider European
economy («Europäische Grossraumwirtschaft»). But the propaganda campaigns
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