61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

The defensive attitude of private business vis-à-vis the restoration of the
property rights of persecution victims was, of course, not without inconsistency.
There were important exceptions where simplified and efficient restitution was
effected; but these cases were certainly exceptions. Moreover, the private sector
was not alone in its attitude. Delaying and minimising tactics were successfully
employed by the authorities in relation to the public property, that is to say the
plundered gold, which found its way into Switzerland or had passed through it.
Once the issue had resulted in a very favourable outcome for Switzerland with
the Washington Agreement (26 May 1946), it was assumed – both in the
Federal government and in influential circles – that the worst was over. What
remained were recollections of supposedly unjustified criticism, whilst the
actions to which this criticism referred were erased from the collective memory.
This loss of memory is well illustrated by the recollections of Alfred Zehnder,
who was Head of the Political Division at the Federal Political Department
(Politische Abteilung des Eidgenössischen Politischen Departements, EPD) from spring
1946. Reflecting on the past in 1980 he commented with satisfaction that «the
earlier suspicions and defamatory comments» had been dispelled in 1946. By
this he meant, amongst other things, the gold which Nazi Germany had taken
from the National Bank of the Netherlands and offered for sale to Switzerland.
Zehnder described this matter as an unproven allegation: «Despite exhaustive
investigations on our part, it has never been possible to confirm the transaction
described. But the rumours and suspicions refused to relent for a very long
time». 5 In reality, Zehnder must have known even then that these «investigations»
were far from exhaustive, and that the «rumours» were therefore
thoroughly pertinent.
The repression of wartime events continued into the 1990s. It can be explained
in part through the desire to safeguard economic and political interests. Where
the banks were concerned, it seems unlikely that the amounts needed for
complete restitution of the accounts really represented any obstacle to their
willingness to co-operate. It is more likely that the efforts made in the post-war
era to reinforce and expand their commercial position as regards asset
management, together with the attractiveness of accounts offering the requisite
anonymity, made the unassailability of banking secrecy appear absolute, and
thus no consideration was given to the special circumstances of clients who had
suffered during the Holocaust era.
Awareness, knowledge, and power
Notwithstanding consideration of all the factual differences between the various
areas we investigated, the present research work clearly demonstrates that
behaviour was dominated by economic and/or political self-interest, the signs
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