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61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

61340 Vorabseiten_e - Unabhängige Expertenkommission Schweiz

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elief that relations would continue, others seemed to expect Germany’s<br />

exclusion from such business to persist for a longer period. «It is shameful how<br />

many people believe they could now profit from these German assets»,<br />

remarked Max Ott, director of the Department for German Assets at the<br />

Clearing Office, with respect to the resulting behaviour and added, on a subsequent<br />

occasion in November 1948: «If the Allied pressure eases on Germany, a<br />

number of Germans may claim that we robbed them.» 151<br />

When the Germans regained their capacity to act in the course of 1949, this<br />

was precisely the situation that arose on a number of occasions. In some cases,<br />

it was only possible to assess the ownership situation at camouflaged German<br />

companies in Switzerland in court. In the early 1950s, the German insurance<br />

companies that had been made independent – Union Rück and Nationalversicherung<br />

– had to make payments in arrears running into millions to the<br />

former German parent companies, as the German parties put forth a credible<br />

argument that the «Swissification» at the beginning of the war had not taken<br />

place unconditionally. The documents in these cases were eloquent. It was also<br />

plain that Nationalversicherung had undoubtedly taken advantage of a<br />

favourable opportunity to free itself of a burdensome and materially oppressive<br />

connection. One of the key managers behind the separation, Hans Theler, was<br />

a Swiss native but had worked for many years for the German Allianz in<br />

Germany, Spain, and Italy in a position of confidence. The Germans found the<br />

conduct of «Mr. Theler and the Union Bank of Switzerland […] to be highly<br />

dishonourable.» 152 Putting the problem into this kind of moral framework was<br />

not unusual. Confidence had always been a key factor in this type of cross-border<br />

business, even in those cases where camouflage was not involved. In Switzerland<br />

too, it was acknowledged – with some irritation – that the Germans were on<br />

the doorstep once again, as if nothing had happened in the meantime.<br />

The Interhandel case<br />

The legal and media discussion in the case of Interhandel, the former Swiss<br />

finance company of the IG Farben group which bore the name IG Chemie until<br />

the end of 1945, took on quite unusual proportions. 153 The Americans<br />

considered this company to be a typical case of German camouflage, whose<br />

significance consisted primarily in its controlling the majority of shares of one<br />

of the most important groups of chemical factories in the USA. As a result of<br />

the virulence of the American reproaches and the extraordinarily large amounts<br />

of capital involved, there was also considerable interest in Switzerland in clarifying<br />

the type of German interests at stake.<br />

Two unusually detailed audits in 1945–46 in the circle of the companies in<br />

question produced a wealth of material. Unlike the usual procedure adopted by<br />

482

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